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Abstract
Telecommunications systems are critical systems with high quality of service con-
straints. In Network Function Virtualization (NFV), commonly known as the Telco
Cloud, network functions are distributed as virtual machines that run on generic
servers in a datacenter. These network functions control critical elements; therefore,
they should be run on trusted hardware.
Trusted computing concepts can be used to guarantee the trustworthiness of the
underlying hardware platform running critical workload. These concepts include the
Trusted Platform Module and Remote Attestation. This work identifies limitations
in existing solutions and uses those as motivation for designing and implementing a
finer-grained definition of trust.
This thesis designs and develops a remote attestation solution, which includes a
policy and rule based mechanism for determining platform trust in a trusted cloud.
Additionally, it develops a fine-grained concept of trust in a cloud environment based
on NFV. Finally, this thesis utilizes the remote attestation solution to develop
a forensics system based on root cause analysis, which allows the investigation of
attestation failures and their mitigation.
Keywords Trusted Computing, NFV, TPM, Cloud Computing, Telecommunications,
RCA
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1 Introduction
The fast development and reduced cost of cloud computing has allowed many industries
to deploy their systems in virtualized environments [14]. The telecommunications in-
dustry has shifted the deployment of their network functions from dedicated hardware
to software modules that run on generic hardware. The version of cloud computing for
telecommunications is called Network Function Virtualization (NFV), also known as
the Telco Cloud [8], which is defined by the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) 1 [15].
Network functions are distributed as one or more Virtual Machines (VMs), which run
as virtual workload on servers. These functions, known as Virtual Network Functions
(VNFs), provide critical functionality to the telecommunications systems.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 2 has defined the specification for a microcon-
troller called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [49], which is often an embedded
chip in the motherboard of a server. This chip can store confidential data, certifi-
cates, keys and cryptographic measurements of system components, including BIOS,
bootloader and kernel. Additionally, it can generate keys and perform cryptographic
functions. However, cryptographic functions will be done slowly, since the TPM is
not a cryptographic accelerator. The latest library specification for TPM is version
2.0, which replaces the previous 1.2 specification [41]. TPMs provide a mechanism
called quoting, which is used to report measurements of a platform to a third party,
who can compare them to known good values to determine platform integrity. This
process is called remote attestation.
There has been previous research on establishing machine trust at boot time and
VNF trust at launch time by utilizing the TPM for integrity verifications and a third
party Remote Attestation Server [43]. Trust is established by verifying that the
underlying hardware platform is in a correct state. Ensuring correct platform state is
crucial, given that VNFs control many critical network elements and functions, such
as routers, firewalls, Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and Mobility Management Entity
(MME). Therefore, we need to guarantee that the correct code is being executed in
a safe environment.
There exist some remote attestation schemes in literature; however, the only open
source remote attestation solution available for cloud platforms is Intel Open Cloud
Integrity Technology (OpenCIT) [22]. OpenCIT leverages platforms with Intel
processors, which include Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [20] extensions.
Intel TXT allows establishing an environment in which software components can be
measured as they are loaded and those measurements stored in the TPM. OpenCIT
checks the integrity of a platform by utilizing a remote attestation server that requests
the measurements stored in the TPM and compares them to known good values.
1https://www.etsi.org/
2https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
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However, this solution presents a few weaknesses, such as lack of flexibility on the
definition of trust and the definition of trust being limited to a fixed point in time.
This work proposes a remote attestation solution, which can reason over platform
trust in a finer-grained manner. Furthermore, it aims to provide a mechanism for
determining the causes of trust failures and introducing mitigations for the affected
device.
1.1 Problem statement
Integrity of a platform is usually measured at boot time, and those measurements
do not change until the next reboot. If the underlying hardware is measured again
during runtime, it will report the same measurements that were stored during boot
time, even though the machine may have been compromised. Most of the servers
running the virtual workload are not rebooted very often. Although there exists
research that focuses on boot time integrity attestation[22, 42, 7], little effort has
been devoted to include run-time integrity measurements in the attestation process.
Additionally, in current remote attestation schemes, the definition of trust is limited
to a boolean value based on the state of a platform at a fixed point in time. TPMs
contain a set of registers that can be extended with measurements. Existing solutions
compare the contents of these registers to whitelisted values, if those values match,
the platform is considered trusted, otherwise it is considered untrusted. Since many of
the existing techniques use the outdated TPM 1.2 specification, these registers are the
only information considered when determining platform trust. However, the newer
TPM 2.0 specification includes a set of metadata that is reported along with system
measurements. Including this metadata in the set of information used to determine
platform trust would allow to reason over the system state in a finer-grained way.
Another limitation of existing attestation solutions is the lack of a notion of history
for the platform measurements and trust status. This prevents reasoning over time
about the trust state of a platform and determining its trustworthiness. For example,
a platform that has been considered trusted every time it has been checked would
be more trustworthy than a platform that has recently changed the status from
untrusted to trusted. However, current attestation solutions would consider those
two platforms equally trustworthy.
Similarly, trust status reasoning is limited to the information provided by the TPM.
Other systems are not considered when determining platform trust. There are many
events that may occur in the system that influence the trust status of a machine, such
as software updates, machine reboots and changes in known good values. Current
schemes do not take these events into consideration when reasoning over trust.
If a platform fails any check, it is considered untrusted and no workload will be
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placed on it. However, there may be non-critical workload that would be suitable
to run on platforms that only pass a subset of those checks. Also, a more flexible
definition of trust can be used to allow machines with known faulty components to
be a part of the trusted cloud. Little research has been directed at defining different
degrees of trust in a cloud.
Finally, there are no forensics mechanisms in place to detect the reason behind
attestation failures. One common thing to do when attestation fails is to prevent
the machine from booting or isolating it from the rest of the network, which makes
difficult diagnosing the reasons for the failure. Having a mechanism in place that
would analyze failures and determine possible causes would allow administrators to
have a deeper understanding of different error scenarios and introduce new actions
to prevent or mitigate these situations.
1.2 Objectives and scope
This thesis has three main objectives.
1. Develop a fine-grained concept of trust in a cloud environment based on NFV.
2. Implement a policy and rule based mechanism to determine platform trust in
a trusted cloud.
3. Propose a forensics system that allows identifying root causes for attestation
failures.
In the scope of this thesis we focus on platforms with a TPM 2.0 on board. However,
this work can be extended to include devices with older versions of TPM and devices
or VMs without a TPM, e.g. by utilizing cryptographic hash measurements. However,
the concept of a TPM and the need to establish a root of trust remain critical.
1.3 Contribution
The research carried out during this thesis resulted in two original publications.
The first publication [40] presents a summarized version of the work in this thesis,
particularly the rule system described in Chapter 4. It discusses the use of remote
attestation and RCA to determine system trustworthiness.
The second publication [39] combines different technologies to build a testbed for
trusted telecommunications systems. The remote attestation solution designed and
implemented in this work is used in the testbed for providing platform trust.
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1.4 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces important
background information for the understanding of this work, such as Network Function
Virtualization and Trusted Computing, and reviews existing solutions. Chapter 3
presents the identified shortcomings in current remote attestation solutions. Chapter 4
describes the architecture and design of our proposed solution. Chapter 5 provides
the implementation details of the system. Chapter 6 discusses the results of our work
and outlines the directions this work can take in the future. Chapter 7 concludes the
thesis work.
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2 Trusted Computing Background
This chapter provides an introduction to Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
and trusted computing. We discuss the proposed architectures for NFV and the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Additionally, we discuss how the TPM can be
leveraged to determine the integrity of a platform. Finally, we review previous work
on remote attestation platforms.
2.1 Network Function Virtualization
Cloud computing has served as an enabler for the telecommunications industry to
move their systems to virtualized environments. Traditionally, deploying network
functions required specialized and proprietary hardware equipment. This equipment
would need to be replaced often, due to fast advances in technology, which repre-
sents a high cost for companies that is not reflected in revenues [14]. Additionally,
updating and managing deployed hardware represents a challenge, since many of
these components are placed in locations that are hard to reach, such as cell towers.
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [14], also known as the Telco Cloud [8], is
the version of cloud computing for the telecommunications industry. It is defined by
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [15] as a reference
architecture as shown in Figure 1. In NFV, the network functions are distributed as
a set of Virtual Machines (VMs), which together form a Virtual Network Function
(VNF). These VMs can be deployed as virtualized workload on traditional servers,
which reduces the need for specialized hardware to run network functions. Further-
more, the cost for deploying, maintaining, upgrading and decommissioning network
functions is reduced, since it can be done at the software level.
The reference architecture depicted in Figure 1 shows a set of components and
how they interact with each other to build NFV. It consists of 5 main functional
blocks: NFV infrastructure (NFVI), the virtualized network functions (VNFs),
element management (EM), management and operations (MANO) and the operations
and business support systems (OSS/BSS). The Network Function Virtualization
Infrastructure (NFVI) contains all the hardware and software components necessary
to deploy a VNF. It contains hardware resources, such as compute, storage and
network. The NFVI is responsible for abstracting the hardware resources, so that the
lifecycle of a VNF is independent of the hardware. It provides virtualized resources
to the VNFs, and, from the perspective of VNF, it is a single entity providing these
resources, instead of a pool of resources.
Virtualized Network Functions are software packages that implement a traditional
network function, such as servers, firewalls and network elements. They are deployed
on top of the NFVI layer, using the resources provided by it. The operations on a
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Figure 1: NFV Reference Architecture (Adapted from [15])
VNF are managed by the Element Management component.
The Management and Operations component comprises the Virtual Infrastructure
Manager (VIM), Virtual Network Funtion Manager (VNFM) and NFV Orchestrator.
The Virtual Infrastructure Manager handles all interaction between a VNF and
the resources provided by the NFVI. The Virtual Network Function Manager is
responsible for managing the lifecycle of a VNF, including instantiation, update and
termination. The NFV Orchestrator is the component responsible for guaranteeing
that there are enough resources available to provide a network service. To do so, it
can interact with the VIM or directly with the NFVI.
Finally, the Operations and Business Support Systems (OSS/BSS) component refers
to the OSS and BSS systems of a mobile network operator, which interact with
MANO and VNFs to support the business operations.
Although there is a clear distinction between these components in the reference
architecture, it is important to note that in practice the roles and functionality may
overlap with one another or the functionality may be merged into a single component.
For example, in OpenStack 3, both VIM and VNFM functionality are included in
the Nova service component.
3https://www.openstack.org/
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2.2 Trusted computing
Trusted computing denotes a set of technologies utilized to establish trust in a
platform. It introduces trust anchors into the system and provides methods for
verifying the integrity of a system. In this section, we discuss the architecture of the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), how it is used to establish a chain of trust for a
platform and the attestation process utilized to verify the integrity of a system.
2.2.1 Trusted Platform Module
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microcontroller available in most server
class hardware. It is a chip embedded in the motherboard of a server, which provides
secure storage of keys, confidential data, certificates, cryptographic measurements of
system components, as well as cryptographic functions and key generation. Figure 2
shows the main components in the architecture of the TPM version 2.0.
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Figure 2: Trusted Platform Module architecture version 2.0 (Adapted from [49])
All interaction between the host system and the TPM is done through the I/O Buffer.
The TPM includes three engines: asymmetric, symmetric and hash. They implement
the algorithm(s) to be used by the TPM for asymmetric and symmetric cryptography,
as well as hashing. The authorization component verifies, before running a command,
that it has the correct authorization to execute. The power detection component gets
notifications on power state changes and manages the TPM power states accordingly.
The execution engine is the component in charge of executing the commands received.
The random number generator (RNG) produces the randomness in a TPM by using
entropy functions, state registers and mixing functions.
At manufacture time, each TPM is provided with a large, random value called a
primary seed. This seed is stored on the TPM and cannot be retrieved. The key
generation component can generate two kinds of keys: ordinary and primary keys.
The former are generated using the RNG, whereas the latter are generated from a
primary seed in the TPM. This component generates two key pairs: Endorsement
Key (EK) and Attestation Key (AK), which give a TPM the notion of unique identity.
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The EK is a storage key which is used as a primary parent key to generate new keys
in the TPM. The AK is a restricted signing key, generated from the EK, which
can only be used for signing data structures generated by a TPM, such as platform
measurements.
Volatile memory stores transient data, such as platform configuration registers (PCRs),
objects loaded to the TPM from external memory and session information. PCRs are
registers used to store measurements of components of the system, including BIOS,
kernel, hypervisor, and operating system. These measurements are cryptographic
hashes of the components. On reset or restart, all PCRs are set to a default initial
value. PCR values cannot be manually set, instead they must be extended. The
extend operation works as follows:
PCRnew = hash(PCRold||new_value)
where || denotes the concatenation operation.
Each TPM provides 24 registers (numbered 0-23) and can provide multiple banks of
such registers depending on the algorithm used to extend the PCR. Our TPMs offer
two PCR banks: SHA1 and SHA256.
Finally, Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) stores persistent data on
the TPM. Part of the NVRAM can be allocated for use by the platform. One use for
NVRAM is to store information and seal it against PCR values. When an NVRAM
area is sealed against a set of PCRs, the contents can only be read when the PCRs
are in the same state as when the area was sealed.
TPM Quotes The TPM provides a mechanism for obtaining measurements of the
platform, called quoting. A quote can be requested for a set of PCRs. The TPM will
generate a structure that contains a digest of the contents of the requested PCRs.
This structure contains other metadata, such as a clock value, number of reboots
and firmware version of the TPM. Table 1 includes the fields of the quote structure.
The generated structure is signed with a restricted signing key (generally the AK).
The TPM returns the structure and the signature to the requester, who now has the
measurements for the system.
2.2.2 Measured boot
Measured or trusted boot is the booting process, in which every component in the
boot sequence measures the next component in line before executing it.
In this process, a trust chain is built starting from the Core Root of Trust Measurement
(CRTM). The CRTM is the first piece of code that is executed on platform boot.
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Field Description
attested A hash over the values of the given PCRs
clock Value of the TPM Clock at quote time
firmware Firmware version of the TPM
magic TCG defined magic value for a quote
qualifiedSigner Name of the key used to sign the quote
resetCount Number of power cycles/boots
restartCount Number of suspend or hibernate events
safe Denotes clock integrity
type Header value for a quote
Table 1: TPM quote fields
It is referred to as a Trusted Building Block (TBB) by the TCG [52], and, since
it is the root of the chain of trust, it should not change during the lifetime of the
platform. The CRTM is usually stored in read-only memory in the BIOS boot block
and is implicitly trusted.
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(2) run
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Monitoring (e.g.
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(9) run
Figure 3: Chain of trust in measured boot
Figure 3 shows an example of the measured boot process, in which each component in
the boot sequence measures the next before executing it. We can identify two different
measurement stages: Static and Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement (SRTM and
DRTM, respectively).
The STRM provides a chain of measurements for the components that are executed
during boot before loading the operating system (OS), as well as their configurations.
It provides an overview of the current state of the platform. The CRTM measures
the BIOS and writes these measurements to PCRs 0-4. Then, the BIOS is executed,
and it measures the bootloader. These measurements are stored in PCRs 5-7. Debug
measurements may be stored in PCR 16.
The DRTM provides a chain of measurements after the OS has booted. It contains
measurements related to the kernel that will be loaded. In order to generate DRTM
measurements, tboot [23] should be placed in the first slot of the bootloader. Tboot
is a tool that can be placed between the bootloader and the operating system, to
provide measurements of the OS kernel to be executed. It will execute an instruction
from Intel TXT [20] to start a measured launch environment (MLE). In this mode,
the processor is limited to a single core and the memory is locked so that only
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authenticated code can run. Intel offers a set of Authenticated Code Modules
(ACMs), which initialize the platform to a well-defined state and are the root of the
DRTM trust chain. After the ACM runs, the control is given back to tboot, which
measures the kernel to be launched by the bootloader and stores these measurements
in PCRs 17 and 18.
PCR Usage
0 CRTM, SRTM, BIOS, Host Platform Extensions, Embedded Option ROMs and PI Drivers
1 Host Platform Configuration (BIOS settings)
2 UEFI driver and application code
3 UEFI driver and application configuration and data
4 UEFI boot manager code (usually the master boot record) and boot attempts
5 Boot manager code configuration and data and GPT/Partition table
6 Host Platform Manufacturer Specific
7 Secure Boot Policy
10 Linux IMA
16 SRTM Debug
17 ACM, MLE, tboot policy and kernel measurements (DRTM)
18 Public key used to sign the ACM, tboot policy and control values (DRTM)
Table 2: PCR usage during measured boot
Table 2 shows a summary of the usage of PCRs in a measured boot. Since PCRs can
only be extended, these measurements are taken by extending the previous PCR.
For example, the value of PCR 1 will be: extend(PCR0, new_measurements). The
extend operation guarantees a chain of trust, since each PCR measurement depends
on the previous one in the chain. Therefore, if a malicious component is present in
the boot sequence, its measurements will be included in one of the PCRs. The chain
of trust will break at that point, since the measurements will be different than the
ones expected, and the component will not be able to forge the measurements for
the subsequent PCRs.
Measured boot should not be confused with UEFI Secure Boot [56]. In secure boot
each component in the boot sequence is signed by a trusted signer. Then, each
component verifies that the signature of the next component in the chain is valid
before executing it. If the signature of a component is invalid, it is not executed.
Note that no measurements are taken of the components, instead only signature
checks are performed. Therefore, secure boot cannot provide proof of the state of
a platform, it can only guarantee that the components executed were signed by a
trusted party.
In measured boot, it is possible to determine the state of the platform by the
measurements taken during boot. Measured and secure boot have different approaches
to unknown components in the boot chain. Measured boot will continue the boot
process even in the presence of an unknown component, whereas secure boot will
prevent their execution.
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2.2.3 Remote attestation
Remote attestation is the process in which a challenger can check the integrity of a
platform with the help of an attestation server. By using measured boot, all platforms
with a TPM will be able to provide measurements that indicate the state of the
platform. In a cloud environment, it is desirable to check if a platform is trusted or
not before launching virtual workload on it. A simple definition of trust states that
a machine is trusted when its measurements match a set of good expected values.
return quote (3)
is machine trusted? (1)
challenger
request quote (2)
trusted/not trusted (5)
Attestation
Server
TPM
Machine 
compare quote to 
known values (4)
Figure 4: Remote attestation process
Figure 4 shows the remote attestation process. In this scenario, a challenger requests
the attestation server to provide a report of the trust status of a machine. The
attestation server is a trusted third party, who stores the set of correct known values
for each machine in the cloud. It can interact with the machine and request a
quote of its measurements. The machine provides the quote, and the attestation
server proceeds to compare the quote to the known values for that machine. This
comparison determines whether the machine is trusted or not. Finally, the attestation
server responds to the challenger with the trust status of the machine. In Section 2.4,
we review some existing implementations of remote attestation services in practice
and literature.
2.3 Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture
The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [46] is an integrity subsystem
in the Linux kernel. It introduces hooks within the Linux kernel to measure the
integrity of a set of files in the filesystem. Files are measured before they are read or
executed, and these measurements are stored into a log that can be consulted by
administrators. Additionally, if a TPM is available, an aggregate integrity value over
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the list of measurements is stored in PCR 10. Any PCR can be used to store this
integrity value; however, 10 is the de facto standard.
IMA uses policies to determine which files are measured in the system. The default
policy aims to measure the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the system, which is
defined as the set of components that are critical to the security of a system [45].
The IMA TCB policy measures all files in the system that are considered sensitive:
executables, libraries mapped to memory and files opened for read by root.
Linux IMA can be used to provide run-time integrity attestation. IMA can detect
changes in a file at run-time, since it re-measures each file before reading or executing
it.
IMA policies can be extended. The kernel documentation includes instructions on
how to write custom policies [59]. In order to define finer grained policies, IMA can
leverage the use of file metadata maintained by Linux Security Modules (LSMs).
One useful LSM is Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [48], which keeps an object
type field in the metadata of each file in the system. SELinux allows the creation of
new custom types. Therefore, we can create a custom type to tag a set of interesting
files for runtime attestation and define an IMA policy over files with this type tag.
IMA policies allow users to indicate custom PCRs to store the integrity value over
the measurements taken by the policy.
1 ...
2 measure func=frame=single, FILE_CHECK obj_type=measure_t pcr=14
3 ...
Figure 5: Example line in custom IMA policy
Figure 5 shows an example of an entry in an IMA policy that indicates that all files
tagged with type measure_t by SELinux should be measured, and the integrity value
over these measurements should be stored in PCR 14.
2.4 Existing solutions
There is a wide variety of work related to trusted computing and remote attestation
in literature. In this section, we discuss existing work related to attestation.
Jacquin et al. [27] introduce a remote attestation solution for verifying the integrity
of Software Defined Networking (SDN) switches and virtual machines, which execute
critical network functions. Their approach uses a verifier, similar to an attestation
server, which communicates with each monitored device and verifies the state of the
platform. This work focuses on extending the capabilities of the TPM to VMs by
using Linux IMA to measure the configurations that are monitored. However, this
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approach uses a limited definition of trust at the platform level, since they evaluate
trust in a pointwise manner with the results stored in the TPM from measured boot.
One drawback of this approach is that the TPM version used was a TPM 1.2, which
is now deprecated.
Similarly, Xu et al. [57] present a mechanism to establish trust between two NFV
platforms by verifying the platform configurations. They use Linux IMA to measure
the platform configurations and store an integrity value over the measurements on
the TPM, as described in Section 2.3. When a platform wants to collaborate with
another platform to provide a network service, the first platform can request the
measurements for the configuration in the second platform and determine whether it
is trusted or not. This work uses an outdated TPM 1.2 simulator. Moreover, they
only focus on inter-platform trust by verifying NFV configurations. The authors do
not discuss in detail the trust establishment process on a platform based on measured
boot.
Extending remote attestation to other architectures has been a topic for extensive
research. With the increasing popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded
devices, research has focused on how to extend trusted computing to these kind of
devices, which often use ARM architectures or are resource constrained [18, 47, 2,
12, 3, 29, 9]. However, this research does not include TPMs, instead they utilize
technologies such as ARM TrustZone security extensions [4]. Other work has focused
on using TrustZone to emulate TPM-like functions [31]. Finally, there is also work
in which TPMs are used for attestation on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [19]
and mobile devices [37, 13].
Although it is possible to find multiple research papers related to remote attestation,
much of this work focuses on the outdated TPM 1.2 version or schemes without a
TPM. The only open source remote attestation solution available for cloud platforms
is the Intel Open Cloud Integrity Technology (OpenCIT) [22], which is the successor of
the OpenAttestation project [24]. Existing work on establishing cloud trust [42, 7, 36]
utilizes OpenCIT and builds on top of it.
Intel CIT provides an attestation service for establishing trust in a cloud environment.
It provides an attestation server, which communicates with the monitored platforms
to determine their trust status, this process is similar to the one described in
Section 2.2.3. Additionally, when starting a VM, it adds the possibility to query
the attestation server for the status of a platform, so that VMs are only started on
platforms with an appropriate trust attestation.
OpenCIT integrates with OpenStack cloud deployments by extending certain Open-
Stack components. These extensions allow the user interface (UI) to display the
attestation results for each monitored machine and add the trust filter into openstack
for VM placement. Unfortunately, OpenCIT suffers of some of the problems identified
in Chapter 1 and discussed in detail in Chapter 3. These problems include a limited
definition of trust and the lack of consideration of previous attestation results and
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other events in the system, when determining current platform status. Moreover, it
seems that OpenCIT is not being actively developed, since the last commit on the
latest release of the project is over one year old (June 2017) 4.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the concept of Network Function Virtualization and
the reference architecture for it. Additionally, we introduced trusted computing
concepts, such as the trusted platform module, how it is used for measured boot
and the process of remote attestation. Finally, we discussed existing work related
to remote attestation and introduced an existing open source solution for remote
attestation in the cloud.
4https://github.com/opencit/opencit/commits/v3.2.1
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3 Problem Statement
This chapter analyzes identified limitations in current remote attestation schemes.
The problems discussed in this chapter served as motivation for the design of the
remote attestation solution presented in this thesis.
3.1 Run-time integrity
In the Telco Cloud, VNFs are run as virtualized workload that uses resources provided
by the NFVI. The NFVI component of NFV comprises a set of hardware platforms,
which are commonly generic server class hardware. One goal of establishing trust in
NFV is to guarantee the integrity of the platform running the VNFs.
Boot time integrity has been achieved by using measured boot in previous work [21,
42, 7, 36] and using the methods described in Chapter 2. This kind of integrity
measurements guarantee the trust chain up until the kernel loading stage. Using
only boot time measurements can represent a challenge, as mentioned by the author
in [43], since the same measurements taken during boot are stored in the TPM until
the next boot. Therefore, the measurements taken some time after boot may become
outdated.
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system
reboot
get measurements
get measurements
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Attestation
Server
6
5
4
3
2
1
Figure 6: Boot time measurements and remote attestation
Figure 6 shows an example situation in which boot time measurements are not enough
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to reliably establish platform trust. In this example, steps 1 and 2 show the measured
boot and remote attestation processes. In step 3, an attacker manages to compromise
the system, e.g. by installing a rootkit. We assume the server is not rebooted in
the time between the attack and the next attestation. The next time the remote
attestation server requests the measurements from the system, the measurements
will appear to match the known values, since they are the measurements taken last
time the machine was booted. Therefore, this malicious software will not be detected
at least until the next time the machine is rebooted (steps 5 and 6). This example
makes it clear that we need to include run-time measurements, in order to have more
reliability in the remote attestation results.
Moreover, there are other parts of the system that should be measured during
run-time to guarantee they have not been tampered with, e.g. hypervisor, critical
software components running as bare metal processes and system configuration files.
Recent research [44] discusses possible attack vectors in NFV by compromising the
hypervisor running the virtual machines.
There exists research that covers run-time integrity measurements [57, 21, 27, 58],
but it focuses on measurements of the virtual workload on the cloud platform.
Guaranteeing the integrity of VMs and VNFs continues to be a popular topic of
research. However, in this thesis we focus on establishing trust in the underlying
NFVI platform, which is not as widely discussed in literature and remains an open
challenge.
3.2 Trustworthiness history
In a remote attestation scheme, the trust in a platform is evaluated by measuring
its components and comparing these measurements to known values. When a
challenger requests the trust status of a device, the attestation server obtains the
latest measurements of the platform and evaluates these against known values to
determine the attestation results, which are then returned to the requesting party.
However, the requesting party only has access to the latest attestation results, since
existing schemes do not store a history of the measurements and attestation results
for each machine they monitor.
Although the challenger is usually interested in the latest state of the platform,
current schemes have the disadvantage that they are not able to provide a trust
history for a device, which would determine its trustworthiness. We consider the
trustworthiness of a machine to be determined by the amount of time it has remained
in a trusted state. By not keeping a history of the attestation results, current remote
attestation solutions are not able to assess the trustworthiness of a machine.
Figure 7 shows an example in which the trust status of two devices (machine 1 and
2) is evaluated over time. We can see that machine 1 is always considered trusted,
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Figure 7: Trustworthiness of two machines
whereas machine 2 is only considered trusted for the latest results (at time t3). If
the attestation server has no notion of history for the measurements taken and trust
status, machine 2 will be considered just as trustworthy as machine 1, although
machine 1 has been trusted for a longer period of time. We wonder if the notion of
history, regarding measurements taken and trust status of a machine, would improve
future decision making of the attestation server. For example, by combining the
trust history of an element with events in the system (see Section 3.4).
3.3 Limited definition of trust
The trust status of a machine is determined by comparing the measurements of its
components (stored in the PCRs of the TPM) against known good values from a
reference machine. In existing work, these measurements are the only information
considered when determining if a platform is trusted or not. However, the TPM 2.0
quote structure that is returned when requesting machine measurements provides
extra metadata, which can be used to aid in deciding on a device’s trust status. This
metadata is part of the quote structure as a set of fields with relevant information
about the platform (e.g. firmware version of the TPM, clock value and amount of
reboots). These fields were described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.
A large amount of existing research utilizes the outdated version 1.2 of the TPM,
which does not include these extra fields in the quote structure. Therefore, the trust
decisions can only be based on PCR values. The remote attestation schemes that
utilize TPM 2.0 still do not consider the extra fields in the quote when determining
trust.
These fields in the quote can prove useful to detect unusual behaviour in the devices
monitored by the attestation server. Take as an example a machine which reports
correct measurements every time it is quoted. However, every time we obtain a new
quote, the reboot count field of the quote reports an increase of 10 in the counter.
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This would indicate that the machine has been rebooted 10 times between quotes,
which would be considered as unexpected behaviour for servers in a datacenter and
would require further investigation.
Another useful field in the quote structure is the firmware version of the TPM. A
recent vulnerability was discovered for a certain version of the TPMs firmware, which
makes RSA keys generated by the TPM insecure [1]. A patch for the firmware of
the TPM was released to fix this vulnerability. The firmware version field of a TPM
would allow us to verify that the TPM in our system runs a patched firmware without
this vulnerability. In a system which does not consider the extra data, a TPM with
a vulnerable firmware would go unnoticed.
Current remote attestation schemes show a limitation by not utilizing the extra
information provided by the TPM, which can be used to create a more comprehensive
definition of trust.
3.4 Considering other systems
In many cloud scenarios, there are other deployed systems, which could provide useful
information to the remote attestation process, such as a patch management system
(PMS) or an intrusion detection system (IDS). Current solutions are not designed to
integrate output of these systems into the attestation process. Components external
to attestation provide context for the events happening in the system. Furthermore,
they can help drive the attestation process.
In the cloud, the machines in the NFVI layer need to be patched periodically. Usually,
there is a system in charge of managing the upgrade process, which includes releasing
patches and triggering updates. If this component can provide input to the attestation
server, we can use it to trigger attestation evaluations.
Figure 8 illustrates how an external system, such as a patch management, can provide
useful information for the attestation process. If we assume the external component
can provide input to the attestation server, when a patch is released for a particular
machine, the attestation server can be notified and take measurements of the machine
before the update. After the update, the attestation server can quote the machine
again to obtain the latest measurements. This approach would allow the attestation
server to verify that both a patch was applied and that it was the correct patch.
Unfortunately, current solutions perform remote attestation in a periodic manner,
since they are not designed to receive input from external systems which could drive
the attestation process.
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Figure 8: Using PMS to trigger remote attestation
3.5 Platform resilience
In existing solutions, when attestation fails, the device is considered untrusted, and
it is not used again until the measurements match the known values again. Moreover,
there are no different degrees of trust for a machine. A machine can only be trusted
or not trusted, depending on whether its measurements match the known values or
not.
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For example, if a server in the NFVI layer that is used to provide virtual resources
to the VNF layer fails its trust check, no virtual workload will be deployed on this
machine. This may be the correct behaviour for critical workload, since we do not
want to run our VNFs in potentially unsafe platforms. However, there may be
situations in which having a weaker definition of trust would allow us to still use the
server to deploy non-critical workload, thus increasing the resilience of the system,
which is considered a key requirement in NFV [16].
Current work considers trust at a single level. However, we consider that remote
attestation can benefit from defining a trust hierarchy which determines different
degrees of trust in a system. Given the previous example, upon a trust failure, the
attestation server could re-evaluate the trust of a machine according to less strict
criteria defined by the trust hierarchy, until the machine reaches a trusted state.
Then, depending on the degree of trust of the machine and the requirements of the
workload, it may be possible to still utilize the resources provided by the platform.
3.6 Analysis of attestation failures
When a machine is considered untrusted as a result of attestation, it is not enough to
isolate the machine until the measurements return to correct values. Ideally, we want
to set mitigations in place for the machine to recover from the failure. Additionally,
we want to investigate the causes for the failures, in order to prevent them in the
future, if possible.
In current solutions it is only possible to check what PCR measurements do not match
the correct values known by the attestation server. Current solutions do not provide
a mechanism that would allow an administrator to analyze attestation failures for a
machine. However, there is no mechanism which would allow an administrator to
analyze and determine the underlying cause of the failure.
We consider that existing work can be extended by defining a procedure or system,
which would allow a system administrator to investigate and understand attestation
failures. Furthermore, the attestation failures can be linked to the actions that need
to be taken, in order to recover the trust in the system.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we identified and discussed in detail a set of shortcomings encountered
in existing work. The drawbacks described here were considered when designing the
architecture of the solution this work proposes.
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4 Architecture and Design
This chapter describes an architectural overview of the remote attestation solution
introduced in this work. We have developed a remote attestation server, which can
monitor elements in a trusted cloud. Furthermore, this attestation server is extended
with a rule system, which allows to define a finer-grained definition of trust. We
have designed a set of agents that sit on the monitored machines. These agents are
used to provide information about the machine, e.g. measurements and identity, as
well as events that have happened, e.g. reboot events, to the attestation server. We
explain each component of the architecture as shown in Figure 9.
Attestation
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Attestation
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Trust Agent 
TPM Software
Stack
TPM
TPM2-Tools
TPM2-ABRMD
TPM2-TSS
/dev/tpm0
Element
Boot agent 
network connection
Attestation UI
User/Admin
Figure 9: Remote attestation architecture (for an element with a TPM)
4.1 TPM tools stack
In order to allow our elements to interact with the physical TPM, we need to set up
and configure a software stack for the TPM. This stack consists of three components:
a library for interacting with the TPM, a resource manager to handle multiple
accesses to the TPM and a set of tools to get the TPM functionality. These are
explained in detail in the next sections.
4.1.1 TPM2 software stack (tpm2-tss)
The TPM2 Software Stack (TSS) [53] is a set of components which handle all
the low-level interaction with the TPM. This software stack implements a set
of APIs for interacting with the TPM. It provides four layers, which implement
each an application programming interface (API). At the upper layer it provides
a System API (SAPI) and an Enhanced System API (ESAPI), which implement
the functionality of all commands that can be sent to a TPM. The next layer
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is the Marshalling/Unmarshalling API, which provides functions for constructing
byte streams to send to the TPM, as well as decomposing the response streams.
Finally, there is the TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI), which provides
a standard interface to send and receive TPM commands. The TSS implementation
is available on GitHub 5.
4.1.2 TPM2 access broker & resource management daemon (tpm2-abrmd)
This is a system-wide daemon that provides two functionalities: resource management
and access brokering [51]. The resource manager functionality acts as a virtual
memory manager for the TPM. Since the memory on the TPM is limited, the
resource manager is in charge of swapping objects in and out of memory as needed, so
they are available for use on the TSS level. The access broker functionality handles
the synchronization between different processes that use the TPM. It guarantees
that no process is interrupted when performing an operation on the TPM. The
implementation of the daemon is available on GitHub 6.
4.1.3 TPM2 tools (tpm2-tools)
These are a set of command line tools used to interact with the TPM. These tools
can either communicate directly with the TPM device or use the resource manager
described in the previous section. The functionality provided includes quoting, listing
the contents of the PCRs, signing, managing keys, creating policies for sealing and
interacting with NVRAM. The implementation of the tools is available on GitHub 7.
The GitHub page also includes a detailed description of the commands implemented.
4.2 Machine agents
Machines in our system are provided with a set of agents that handle the communi-
cation with the attestation server. We have defined two agents, which are described
in the next sections.
4.2.1 Trust agent
The trust agent is a process that runs on every element, which serves as a communi-
cation link between the TPM and the attestation server. It uses the TPM tool stack
5https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss
6https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-abrmd
7https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools
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to obtain information from the TPM and report it back to a third party (usually the
attestation server). The information the trust agent can report to the attestation
server includes element quotes, TPM capabilities, NVRAM areas defined on the
TPM, system information about the element, EK and AK of the TPM.
4.2.2 Boot agent
The boot agent is a process that runs on every element, which serves as a source of
information about the reboot events on an element. It provides information about
the system state to the attestation server. The main responsibility of the agent is to
report boot events to the attestation server. This agent will alert the attestation
server whenever the element is shutdown or started up.
4.3 Attestation database
1..*
1..*
follows
Element Policy
for
Quote
1..*
Ruleset Rule
Policy Set
Figure 10: Relationship between different attestation data structures
The attestation database stores information about the elements in the system, the
existing policies, their measurements and the different rules used to determine trust
of an element. It also stores information about events that happen in the system.
Figure 10 shows how the different data structures are related to each other. Elements
may have one policy set associated to them, which is composed by one or more
policies. Similarly, they may have one or more quotes taken for them. The quotes
are always taken for one specific element and one policy. Finally, the elements follow
one ruleset, which is composed of one or more rules. The rules and rulesets will be
explained in more detail in Section 4.6
In the following sections, we will explain in detail the definitions of elements, quotes,
policy sets and policies.
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Figure 12: Types of measurements
4.3.1 Elements
An element is any device that is attestable. We consider an element attestable when
it can be uniquely identified and measured. The attestable elements in our cloud
include servers, laptops and IoT devices. Figure 11 shows some of the different
notions of identity our elements have. Note that this is not a comprehensive list.
Some of these identities are more permanent than others, e.g. IP addresses and
OpenStack IDs may change easily, whereas the endorsement and attestation key
pairs cannot be changed unless the TPM is replaced on the element.
Similarly, Figure 12 shows some of the different types of measurements we can take of
an element. Most of our elements are measurable using TPM 2.0, but other ways of
measuring elements include TPM 1.2 and hash values. Again, this list is incomplete
and can be extended to include other forms of measurements.
Table 3 shows the information fields stored in the database for an element.
4.3.2 Quotes
The process of obtaining measurements from a device with a TPM is called quoting.
A quote is a data structure generated by the TPM upon request for measurements for
a set of given PCRs. This structure contains a hash over the values of the requested
PCRs, as well as some interesting metadata, which includes the number of reboots,
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Field Description
_id Unique ID given to the element on the database
ek Public part of the Endorsement Key of the TPM
ak Public part of the Attestation Key of the TPM
ip IP address
kinds List of human readable type names/tags for this element, e.g. Element::TpmMachine
last_trust_decision_event ID of the event that contains the last trust decision made for the element
name A human readable name for the element
openstack_id Unique identifier given to the element by OpenStack
policies List of policies this element is associated with
ruleset_id ID of the ruleset that must be evaluated to determine the trust status of the element
status Indicates whether an element is trusted or not
timestamp Indicates the time that the element was last updated
uname System information obtained by executing uname -a
Table 3: TPM element fields
number of suspensions, a clock value and the firmware version of the TPM. Table 4
shows the fields included in the quote data structure.
Additionally, the quote structure is signed by either the Attestation Key of the TPM
or a given suitable signing key.
Field Description
_id Unique ID given to the quote on the database
element_id ID of the element for which the quote is
kind A human readable type name, e.g. Quote::TPM2.0
quote A dictionary containing the quote structure from the TPM (see Table 1)
pcrs A dictionary containing the PCR values at the time of the quote
timestamp Indicates the time that the quote was added to the database
Table 4: Quote fields
4.3.3 Policies
Policies are a mapping between a possible measurement that can be taken from an
element (e.g. a set of PCRs) and the correct expected value for that measurement.
Policies are built based on a reference machine by quoting it for a set of PCRs
and storing the PCRs and quote results. The attestation database stores these
measurements and the expected values. Therefore, next time an element is quoted,
the value can be compared to the expected one on the database.
Table 5 shows the information fields stored in the database for a policy.
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Field Description
_id Unique ID given to the policy on the database
pcrs Measurement that can be taken from a TPM element, in this case a list of PCRs
expected_value Correct value for the measurement described in the PCRs field
kind A human readable type name, e.g. Policy::TPM2.0
name A human readable name for the policy
timestamp Indicates the time that the policy was last updated
Table 5: TPM policy fields
4.3.4 Policy sets
A policy set is a collection of policies for a particular element. Each policy contains a
measurement to be taken for a specific component of an element, e.g. CRTM, SRTM
or DRTM. A policy set combines all the policies that belong to a single element.
Policy sets are used by the attestation server to determine what measurements to
request from the trust agent running on the element. Table 6 shows the information
fields stored in the database for a policy set.
Field Description
_id Unique ID given to the policy on the database
policy_ids IDs of the policies in this policy set
kind A human readable type name, e.g. Policy::PolicySet
name A human readable name for the policy set
timestamp Indicates the time that the policy set was last updated
Table 6: TPM policy set fields
4.4 Attestation server
The attestation server is the component of the system responsible for obtaining
measurements from elements and determining their trust status based on predefined
policies. The attestation server interacts with the attestation database to store
and retrieve information necessary for managing the trust in the cloud. It handles
all operations over the items stored in the database and described in this chapter:
elements, policies, quotes, policy sets, rules, rulesets and events.
The attestation server knows how to communicate with NFVI elements to request
measurements. It can receive event notifications from the elements, such as updates
or reboots. Additionally, it can communicate with NFV MANO elements to provide
information about the trust status of NFVI elements. It can be queried by third
parties and asked to evaluate the trust status of a platform. The information obtained
from the attestation server can be used by other systems. For example, the trust
status of a platform can be used as an extra criterion by OpenStack to decide on
which machine to deploy virtual machines on.
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The rule system described in Section 4.6 is a component within the attestation server
in charge of determining the trust status of an element. Finally, the attestation
server provides the information that is displayed by the attestation UI.
4.5 Attestation UI
The attestation UI is the component responsible for providing a human friendly
overview of the cloud status to an user or administrator. It is used as a dashboard
for the cloud administrator to quickly determine the overall trust status of the cloud.
Additionally, it contains information about the system known by the attestation
server, such as elements, policies, policy sets and quotes. Furthermore, it includes
detailed reports on how the trust of an element was determined by running a ruleset
against an element and its policy set. It shows what rules were evaluated, and, if the
trust checks fail, it allows the user to determine why.
4.6 Rule system
We introduce a rule system to reason over the definition of trust for elements in
our cloud infrastructure. This rule system contains individual rules that evaluate to
a boolean value and rulesets that combine these rules, in order to create different
definitions of trust.
4.6.1 Rules
The rules reason over an element and a policy. Each rule has an apply function that
runs the rule and returns a Boolean value, which indicates if the rule is followed or
not. The result of running a rule is added to the attestation database as an event.
Static rules A static rule reasons over a quote for a policy and an element at a
specific point in time. The quote over which the static rules reason is usually the
latest quote taken for that element and policy. The element must follow the policy
for which it is quoted, and the quote must be for that specific policy.
TPM quotes include a set of values that can be used to determine if an element is
trusted at a given point in time. Static rules reason over these values for a single
quote and compare them to correct expected values.
Given an element e, a quote q and a policy p for q, and assuming that e follows p,
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we define the logic of a static rule called “Correct attested value” in Equation 1.
correctAttestedValue(q, p) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.attested = p.expectedValueFalse, otherwise (1)
This rule compares the ‘attested’ field of the quote to the expected value indicated
in the policy stored in the attestation database. The ‘attested’ field contains a digest
of the contents of the given PCRs. The policy for this quote stores the PCRs and
the expected ‘attested’ value for that PCR combination. The rule will be satisfied
when the attested value matches the expected value, and it will fail when it does not
match.
Appendix A contains a detailed description of all the static rules defined in our rule
system.
Temporal rules Our attestation database stores quotes taken for an element over
time. This allows us to include temporal reasoning into our definition of trust, since
we can monitor the changes on specific parts of quotes in a specific time frame.
Furthermore, we can reason over changes in different parts of the system (e.g. patch
management, virtual infrastructure management and networking) in the time interval
between two quotes.
We define rules that reason over two quotes for a policy and an element. These two
quotes are usually the two latest quotes; however, they can also be any pair of quotes
given that one happens at some point in time before the other one. Since all the
quotes in the attestation database are timestamped, it is trivial to select the two
latest quotes. There are some known behaviours along time for different fields of a
quote. We can use the temporal rules to verify that the values are changing, or not
changing, as expected.
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of two temporal rules over the ‘resetCount’ field of a quote in equations 2 and 3.
resetCountNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.resetCount = q′.resetCountFalse, otherwise (2)
resetCountIncreased(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.resetCount < q′.resetCountFalse, otherwise (3)
The ‘resetCount’ field of a quote is a counter that increases every time an element
is rebooted [49]. It is reset to zero when the TPM is cleared. During the normal
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lifecycle of an element, the reset count should either stay the same or increase. If the
reset count decreases, it may be an indicator that the TPM was reset to the factory
defaults.
Additionally, we define rules that reason over the events that happened between
a pair of quotes. Since the attestation database stores all boot and update events
for an element, we can define temporal rules that check if an element has changed
between quotes, e.g. updated or rebooted. Similarly, we store any update events to
the policy of the element, which allows us to detect policy changes between quotes.
Given an element e and pair of quotes for e, q and q′, assuming q was taken before q′,
we define the logic of the temporal rule that checks if an element has been updated
in Equation 4.
elementUpdated(e, q, q′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
True, (∃ u ∈ getEvents(q.timestamp, q′.timestamp) |
u.type = ‘element update’ ∧ u.element = e)
False, otherwise
where:
getEvents(t, t′) = {e | t ≤ e.timestamp ≤ t′ ∧ e is an event in the attestation DB} (4)
Every time an element is updated, we store an ‘update’ event in the attestation
database. Similar to the previous rule, this rule reasons over ‘update’ events for an
element that may have happened between two quotes. Combined with other rules,
it allows us to detect situations in which changes in a quote are due to a software
update on the element. This rule will be satisfied when the element has been updated
between quotes, and it will fail otherwise.
Similarly, given a set of reboot events B and a pair of quotes for e, q and q′, assuming
q was taken before q′, in Equation 5, we define the logic of a temporal rule that
checks if the amount of reboots reported by an element matches the amount of reboot
events stored in the database for the time interval between q and q′.
resetCountMatchesReboots(q, q′, B) =
{
True (q′.resetCount − q.resetCount) = |B|
False otherwise
(5)
This rule will be satisfied when the amount of reboots reported by an element matches
the reboot events between quotes and fail otherwise.
Appendix B contains a detailed description of all the temporal rules defined in our
rule system.
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Compound rules Finally, we define a set of compound rules. A compound rule
reasons over a group of rules, which can be static or temporal. These kind of rules
allows us to build more complex reasoning over the simple rules we have defined so
far.
On their own, static and temporal rules do not have enough information to determine
trust status. There may be situations in which one of the previous rules will fail if
considered individually. However, when we combine the output of different rules, we
can build a more detailed context to make a decision.
There are two basic types of compound rules: AND and OR rules. Given a set of
rules R, we define the logic of an AND rule in Equation 6 and the logic of an OR
rule in Equation 7. An AND rule will evaluate all its children rules and return True
if all the children rules were satisfied. On the other hand, an OR rule will evaluate
all its children rules and return True if at least one of the children rules was satisfied.
Note that we can build trees with these rules, since compound rules can be both
parent and children rules.
AndRule(R) =
⎧⎨⎩True (∀ rule ∈ R | rule.result = True)False otherwise (6)
OrRule(R) =
⎧⎨⎩True (∃ rule ∈ R | rule.result = True)False otherwise (7)
We introduce an example of a compound rule for checking the amount of reboots for
an element. The TPM keeps a reset counter that tracks the amount of times the
element has been rebooted. Our system stores boot events every time an element
in the trusted cloud reboots. This rule checks that the amount of reboots reported
by the TPM and the attestation database are the same. It uses the result of the
rules: “resetCountNotChanged” (described in Equation 2), “resetCountIncreased”
(Equation 3) and “resetCountMatchesReboots” (Equation 5). Given a pair of quotes
q and q′ (assuming q was taken before q′), and a set of reboot events B during the
time interval between q and q′, we define the logic of the rule in Figure 13.
This compound rule is an OR rule, since there are two possible situations to evaluate:
when the machine has rebooted and when it has not. In the case when the machine
has not rebooted, we check that the TPM reset count has not changed. On the other
hand, if the machine has rebooted, we check that the TPM reset count has increased
and that the reset count matches the amount of reboot events in the attestation
database. This rule will be satisfied when the machine has not been rebooted, or
when there have been reboots and the amount of reboots matches the reboot events
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Reboot count matches TPM count
(OR Rule)
The machine has rebooted
(AND Rule)
resetCountMatchesReboots(q, q′, B)
(Equation 5)
resetCountIncreased(q,q′)
(Equation 3)
resetCountNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation 2)
Figure 13: Example of a compound rule (Reboot count matches TPM count)
in the database. It will fail if the TPM reset counter has decreased or if the amount
of reboot events does not match the counter.
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Figure 14: Element was updated and policy changed between quotes
Compound rules can be used to define how trust should be evaluated in complex
scenarios. Figure 14 shows the case when the element gets a software update, which
affects one of its policies, and the policy is updated to reflect this change. Both
updates happen between quotes q and q′. In this situation, the attested value changes;
however, since the policy was updated, the latest quote will still satisfy the policy.
Figure 15 shows the logic for the rule. Note that the equations for some of the
children rules are defined in Appendix B.
Element was updated
and policy changed between quotes
(AND Rule)
policyChanged(p, q, q′)
(Equation B18)
elementUpdated(e, q, q′)
(Equation 4)
attestedChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B16)
correctAttestedValue(q′, p)
(Equation 1)
Figure 15: Element was updated and policy changed between quotes (AND Rule)
Therefore, if an element has been updated between quotes, but the policy has been
changed to reflect this update, we can still consider the element trusted.
45
4.6.2 Rulesets
The rules described previously can be combined in different rulesets. These rulesets
define trust. For an element to be trusted against a ruleset, all the rules in the ruleset
must evaluate to True.
Elements are associated with a ruleset and a policy set. For an element to be
considered trusted, the ruleset must be evaluated against all the policies in the policy
set the element is associated to, and the rules must evaluate to True. Rulesets have
an apply functionality, which runs the rules in the ruleset against an element and a
policy. They also have a decision functionality, which applies the ruleset against an
element and all the policies in the policy set. Finally, the ruleset generates a trust
decision event that is stored on the attestation database and updates the trust status
of the element.
Rulesets can be constructed in such a way that their definition of trust can vary in
strictness. Furthermore, a partial order can be derived over the different rulesets
defined. In this work, we use the rules defined previously to construct four rulesets
(in ascending strictness order):
Minimal This ruleset contains the minimum amount of rules that need to be run
to consider an element trusted at a single point in time. It checks that the quote
satisfies the policy, the signature is valid, the firmware is one of the known ones and
the magic and value types are correct. The rules included are defined in the following
equations in appendix A: A1, A2, A7, A5 and A6.
Minimal + clock increasing This ruleset extends the “Minimal” ruleset by
adding a temporal check over the value of the clock. It checks the same conditions
as the minimal ruleset. Additionally, it checks that the clock is increasing between
quotes. The rules included are defined in the following equations in appendices A
and B: A1, A2, A7, A5, A6 and B5.
Minimal + clock integrity This ruleset extends the “Minimal” ruleset by adding
temporal and integrity checks over the value of the clock between quotes. It checks
the same conditions as the minimal ruleset. Additionally, it checks that the clock
is increasing between quotes. If the clock is decreasing between quotes it checks
whether the clock value is reliable or not, based on the safe value reported by the
TPM. The rules included are defined in the following equations in appendices A, B
and C: A1, A2, A7, A5, A6 and C2.
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Extended This ruleset extends the“Minimal + clock integrity” ruleset by adding
additional temporal checks to the trust evaluation. Additional checks include detailed
reboot checks, to determine if the element has been rebooted or suspended, and if so,
checks that the TPM counters reflect the possible changes in state (e.g. upon reboot,
the reset count increases). In addition, this ruleset checks that the firmware version
of the TPM has not changed between quotes. The rules included are defined in the
following equations in appendices A, B and C: A1, A2, A7, A5, A6, C2, C6 and B3.
Extended + reboot comparison This ruleset expands the “Extended” ruleset
by adding a more detailed check on the reboot count of the element. It includes
rules that cross check the amount of reboots reported by the TPM with the amount
of reboots stored in the attestation database. The rules included are defined in the
following equations in appendices A, B and C: A1, A2, A7, A5, A6, C2, C6, B10
and B3.
Complete This ruleset expands the previous one by adding checks over more fields
of the quote and detailed checks to the attested value, which consider update events
happening in the system. It checks the behaviour of those fields which are supposed
to change between quotes (quote and signature) and those which do not (magic, type
and qualified signer). Additionally, it checks the events in the attestation database to
explain changes in the attested value. The rules included are defined in the following
equations in appendices A, B and C: A1, A2, A7, A5, A6, C2, C6, B10, B3, B17,
B7, B1, B4, B2 and C17.
4.7 Attestation forensics and root cause analysis
We have now defined a set of rules that can be evaluated at any time against an
element to determine its trust status. Usually, an element is bound to fail the trust
checks at some point during its lifecycle. Using Root Cause Analyis (RCA), we can
map these failures to Causal Factor Trees (CFT) or Ishikawa diagrams [26], which
contain possible causes for the failure. Furthermore, we can map these trees to
mitigation procedures, which is a step towards automating the recovery from trust
failures. These mitigation procedures can be adapted to address the identified failure
situations and the probability of the event [10].
Our Causal Factor Trees are diagrams inspired by fault tree analysis [54, 25] and
why-because analysis [32]. These analysis techniques identify factors surrounding the
fault or failure and show the causality relationships between such events. Fault tree
analysis combines the events by using logical gates, whereas in why-because analysis
an edge from one node to another directly indicates causality. In our CFTs, the root
node is the failure detected, and all the branches of the tree are possible causes for
the failure. Each child node answers to the question “why?”. If a node has more
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than one child it is because there are many possible causes for that failure. The leaf
nodes contain the root causes for the failure in the topmost node.
Reboot count
is different
from TPM's
reset count
TPM's resetCount is
less than attestation
server's reboot
count
TPM's resetCount is
greater than
attestation server's
reboot count
Element's trust
agent (systemd
services) were
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Element was
rebooted
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before the
element started
Element is a
server that
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startup
Element is a
portable device that
connects to
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Figure 16: Causal factor tree for reboot trust failure
Figure 16 shows a CFT constructed for the scenario in which an element fails its
trust check, due to an inconsistency in the amount of reboots reported by the TPM
and the ones stored on the attestation database.
The amount of times a machine has been rebooted is counted in two ways in our
system. One of them is the reset count reported by the TPM on a quote event, which
is considered to be accurate. The second way is by using the boot agent installed on
the element. Occasionally, we can detect a mismatch between these two counters.
However, there may be a valid reason for this.
There are two possible failure situations: the TPM can either report a lower or
a higher amount of reboots than the ones stored in the attestation database. In
the first case, a cause for this failure may be a manual restart of the agents of the
element (boot or trust agent). Since these are systemd services, they can be manually
restarted, which would report a reboot event to the attestation database that did
not really happen. In the second case, we have identified two possibilities for the
count reported by the TPM to be higher, one detected when using portable devices
and the other one detected when using server class hardware.
Portable devices, such as laptops, are usually moved in and out of the internal
network. When these elements are outside of the internal network, they cannot
report their reboots to the attestation database. Therefore, it is possible that the
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elements reboot outside of the network, in which case the TPM would record these
events but the attestation database would not.
On the other hand, we don’t expect servers to move outside of the internal network.
However, this kind of hardware often includes self-checks on startup. These self-check
procedures may include multiple reboots before the boot loader is executed. Once
more, in this situation, the TPM will have an account of these reboots that the
attestation database fails to record.
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Figure 17: Fishbone diagram for reboot trust failure
In an Ishikawa or Fishbone diagram the “why?” question is answered in a different
way. Each diagram has five main bones that represent a different aspect or part of
the system. The main bones contain smaller bones, which describe possible causes
for the failure that relate to the part of the system the main bone describes.
Figure 17 shows the same trust failure scenario described using an Ishikawa or
fishbone diagram. This kind of RCA diagram allows us to differentiate between
different parts of the system when analyzing the causes for a failure. It allows to
individually analyze the areas that may be responsible for the failures, such as the
hardware or software of element in question, the attestation server, the network, the
actions of users and the methods used by the attestation procedures set in place.
The diagram in Figure 17 has five main bones: Material, Method, Machine, Man/Peo-
ple and Measurement/Medium/Environment.
The ‘Material’ bone represents the hardware of the element in question. Under
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this branch, we describe all possible causes that can be attributed to an element’s
hardware. In this particular case, we identified two possible hardware causes for
the reboot count mismatch: a malfunctioning TPM chip or an erroneous TPM
implementation.
The ‘Method’ bone includes all the processes followed in the system. Under this
branch, we describe all possible causes that can be attributed to the way things are
done. In our case, we identified one possible cause: reboot events not being logged.
Then, we have two possible sub-causes for reboot events not being logged in the
system: the machine agents (trust and boot agents) are either not installed or not
enabled.
The ‘Machine’ bone comprises both the behavior of the element and the software in
the element. Under this branch, we identified two causes, which have their own sub
causes. The first cause is the element having access to outside networks, due to being
a portable device. The second cause is the machine being a server, which means
entering the BIOS when rebooting triggers self testing, and self testing increases the
reboot count.
The ‘Man/People’ bone includes all the causes related to actions of users of the
system. Under this branch, we identified three causes: the element being rebooted
outside of the corporate network, the machine agents being manually restarted and
the manual logging of additional reboot events.
Finally, the ‘Measurement/Medium/Environment’ bone includes all causes related
to other subsystems the element interacts with. Under this branch, we identified one
possible cause: the reboot events not being logged to the attestation server, due to
it being unavailable.
Many of the causes identified in the bones of the Ishikawa diagram are similar. The
separation of these into different branches allow us to identify the aspect of the system
in which the failure may be corrected. This kind of diagram can be helpful when
designing mitigation procedures to the trust failures, since it would help identify in
what area these should be placed.
This failure is only one of the many trust failures we have identified in the proof of
concept of this work. Appendices D and E include a list of these Causal Factor Trees
and Ishikawa diagrams.
4.7.1 Extending rules and rulesets
Root Cause Analysis with Causal Factor Trees and Ishikawa diagrams allow us to
identify situations in which trust or trustworthiness of an element can be safely
recovered. We can consider the situation in which the TPM of an element reports a
higher count of reboots than the ones in the attestation database, from Figures 16
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and 17. We noticed that this behavior was normal in server class hardware. Therefore,
we can identify the servers in our cloud that show this kind of behavior and create a
new rule.
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ (assuming q was taken before q′), and a set of reboot
events B during the time interval between q and q′, we define the logic of the rule in
Equation 8.
resetCountHigherThanReboots(q, q′, B) =
{
True (q′.resetCount − q.resetCount) ≥ |B|
False otherwise
(8)
We can add the rule described in Equation 8 to the ruleset of the element or class of
elements. Next time the element is attested, a higher reboot count from the TPM
will not make this element not trusted, since this will be considered normal behavior.
RCA allows us to detect failures and set the correct mitigations in place. Furthermore,
combined with our rule system, we can modify and introduce new rules to create
a finer-grained definition of trust. This definition of trust can change from one
element to another, which allows us to deal with atypical behavior that does not
affect trustworthiness of an element.
4.8 Event system
Our attestation server takes into consideration events that happen in the system when
determining the trust status of an element. These events and relevant information
about them are stored in the attestation database, to allow them to be checked when
making a trust decision. Events can be for a specific element, from the attestation
server or even from other system components. Table 7 shows the common fields for
all events stored on the attestation server.
Field Description
event_type A human readable name that describes the event type
result Boolean value that indicates if the event was successful or failed
error_msg Optional message describing an error. It is included when the result is False
_id Unique ID for the event on the database
timestamp Time when the event was stored in the database
Table 7: Common event fields
In the next sections, we describe the structure of the main types of events used by
the rule system.
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4.8.1 Boot events
Each element has a software component, called the boot agent, which communicates
with the attestation server. Every time that element reboots, the boot agent will send
an event to be stored in the attestation database with details about the reboot. The
event_type field for these events is “Boot event”. Additionally, boot events contain
an extra field called element_state which can be “START” or “STOP” depending on
whether the element has been shut down or powered on. One STOP and one START
boot event pair are considered one reboot for an element. Finally, they include an
element_id field that indicates the ID of the element being rebooted.
4.8.2 Element software updates
Each element has a software component, which communicates with the attestation
server whenever an element is updated. When an update occurs, the element will
inform the attestation server and an update event will be stored on the attestation
database. The event_type field for these events is “Command run”. They include
three extra information fields, which are described in Table 8.
Field Description
event_id ID of the element being updated
command Command used to update the element, e.g. apt-get update
output Output of running the command
Table 8: Additional fields for element software update events
4.8.3 Attestation database updates
Similarly, when an element, policy or policy set stored on the attestation database is
modified or updated, the attestation server stores an update event. These events
are particularly useful to keep track of how these elements change over time, since it
may be relevant for creating rules and rulesets. They include three extra information
fields as shown in Table 9
4.8.4 Rule run events
Every time a rule is run, an event is generated and stored on the attestation database.
These contain information about the rule, such as for what element, policy and
quotes the rule is evaluated and the result of evaluating the rule.
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Element update
Field Description
element_id ID of the element being updated in the database
old_element Copy of the element stored in the database before the change
new_element Copy of the element stored in the database after the change
new_parameters Parameters to be updated
Policy update
Field Description
policy_id ID of the policy being updated in the database
old_policy Copy of the policy stored in the database before the change
new_policy Copy of the policy stored in the database after the change
new_parameters Parameters to be updated
Policy set update
Field Description
policy_set_id ID of the policy set being updated in the database
old_policy_set Copy of the policy set stored in the database before the change
new_policy_set Copy of the policy set stored in the database after the change
new_parameters Parameters to be updated
Table 9: Additional fields for attestation database update events
4.8.5 Ruleset run events
A ruleset contains a collection of rules that are applied to an event and a policy. As
mentioned before, when an individual rule is evaluated an event is generated. A
ruleset keeps a list of the IDs of such events. After all the rules in a ruleset are run,
an event is stored in the database that includes the result of running the ruleset
against a particular element and policy, as well as a list of event IDs for each of the
rules included in the ruleset.
4.8.6 Trust decision events
To evaluate the trust status for one element, we need to run the ruleset against all
the policies in the policy set of the element. A trust decision event is generated
after running a ruleset against an element and its policy set. It contains the final
trust status for the element, the ID of the element, the ID of the policy set, the
ruleset used to determine the trust status and the list of IDs for each ruleset run
event generated after running a ruleset against a policy. This trust decision event
contains all the information used to determine the trust status of an element.
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4.9 Attestation server in the ETSI NFV architecture
Our system introduces the attestation server as a new component to the ETSI NFV
reference architecture. Figure 18 shows the modified architecture, which includes the
attestation server. We consider the attestation server as a MANO element, which
provides interfaces to communicate with the VIM, VNFM, VNFs and NFVI. NFVI
includes the physical servers on which the VNFs are run. VNFs can be deployed
as one or more VMs on the servers provided by the NFVI. For simplicity reasons,
in this work, we assume that a VNF is always deployed as a single VM. Since, in
practice, many of the VNFs are considered a single VM, we consider this to be a
reasonable assumption.
NFV MANO
VNF
NFVI
OSS/BSS NFV
Orchestrator
VNFM
VIM
Attestation
Server
1
2
Figure 18: Remote attestation server in the NFV Architecture
We identify two main scenarios in which the attestation server is used (denoted 1 and
2 in Figure 18). In Scenario 1, the attestation server communicates with the VNFM
and VNFs to provide information about the trustworthiness of the underlying NFVI
layer or the other VNFs. In Scenario 2, the attestation server interacts with the VIM
and NFVI elements. The NFVI elements can interact with the attestation server
to report measurements, reboot events or software updates, by using the machine
agents. Similarly, the attestation server can communicate with the VIM to obtain
information about the NFVI elements, such as confirmation about the reboot events
or IP addresses. Scenario 2 is the main focus this thesis; although, the attestation
server was built to easily support and explore Scenario 1.
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4.10 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the architecture of our system and discussed its
components in detail. Additionally, we described the design of our rule system, which
aims to introduce flexibility to the definition of trust for an element. Furthermore, we
discussed the integration of root cause analysis to our system, to obtain attestation
forensics. Finally, we discussed the modifications to the ETSI NFV architecture to
include the attestation server.
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5 Implementation
This chapter discusses the implementation of the architecture described in Chapter 4.
We include implementation details of the attestation server, tools, UI and machine
agents. Finally, we discuss particular use cases in the system.
5.1 Trusted infrastructure
Our cloud consists of a set of elements that are monitored by the attestation server.
Table 10 shows a summary of these elements and their specifications. Our trusted
cloud includes two Nokia Airframe servers, three Intel Next Unit of Computing
(NUC)8 mini PCs and two laptops. The servers are used as compute nodes in our
local trusted cloud deployed on OpenStack. The VNFs in the cloud would be deployed
on these servers. The NUCs are used for experiments in the testbed as IoT devices.
Finally, the laptops are for regular use, e.g. work and Internet browsing.
Element OS Kernel TPM Firmware
Compute (Nokia Airframe) Ubuntu 17.10 4.10 1407374883832066
Compute2 (Nokia Airframe) Ubuntu 17.10 4.10 1407374883832066
NUC1 (Intel NUC) Ubuntu 16.04 4.4 1407641172325888
NUC2 (Intel NUC) Fedora 27 4.16.7 1407641172325888
NUC3 (Intel NUC) Fedora 27 4.16.7 1407641172325888
Lenovo Thinkpad X1 v5 Ubuntu 18.04 4.15 1970586830692608
Lenovo Thinkpad X1 v6 Ubuntu 18.04 4.15 19984776037404676
Table 10: Trusted cloud elements
These elements are configured with different releases of Ubuntu and Fedora, as
well as different kernel versions, since we wanted to test our solution on different
environments. Additionally, the TPMs in our elements have slightly different versions,
which causes occasional changes in behaviour from one platform to another, due to
implementation differences.
We have enabled Intel TXT and the TPM in the BIOS for all elements in our cloud,
to obtain SRTM measurements. Additionally, we have installed tboot and modified
our bootloader (GRUB 9), to load tboot first, to obtain DRTM measurements. With
this configuration, all our elements are capable of performing measured boot as
described in Section 2.2.2.
Also, we have set up each device with the TPM 2.0 tools stack 4.1, which includes the
libraries to interact with the TPM, the resource manager daemon and the command
8https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/products/boards-kits/nuc.html
9https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/index.html
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line tools. Figure 19 shows the result of executing the tpm2_pcrlist tool, which
prints the contents of the PCR banks, after a successful measured boot. We can
see that PCR 0 contains CRTM measurements, PCRs 0-7 and 16 contain SRTM
measurements, PCRs 17 and 18 contain DRTM measurements and PCR 10 contains
measurements for the TCB as defined by Linux IMA.
Figure 19: PCR contents after measured boot
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5.2 Machine agents
Each device is provisioned with a trust and a boot agent, which are necessary for
interacting with the attestation server. Both agents are implemented using Python
2.7 10 and deployed on the element as systemd 11 services.
5.2.1 Trust agent
The trust agent is the component in charge of providing information about the device
to the attestation server. It can report three sets of information to the attestation
server: identity, quote/measurements and capabilities. It is implemented as a Flask 12
server, which provides a REST API (Representational State Transfer Application
Programming Interface) used by the attestation server to request information. It is
started as a systemd service after booting the device. Table 11 shows the endpoints
of the trust agent API.
URL Operation Description Result
/identity/(key_handle) GET Obtain iden-
tity informa-
tion of the el-
ement
Dictionary
containing
EK, AK and
extra data
/capabilities/(key_handle) GET Obtain TPM
capabilities
Dictionary
containing
the TPM
capabilities
/quote/(pcr_string)/(key_handle) GET Obtain a
quote for a
set of PCRs
TPM quote
and PCRs
/keys/(key_handle) GET Obtain a pub-
lic key stored
in the TPM
Requested
public key
/get_ev/(pcr_string) GET Obtain the
expected at-
tested value
for a set of
PCRs
Attested
value
Table 11: Trust agent REST API endpoints
Each endpoint takes a key_handle, which is the handle of a key in the TPM. This
key will be used to sign the response from the trust agent. Additionally, they take a
10https://www.python.org/
11https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/
12http://flask.pocoo.org/
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Receive parameters 
handle: 0x0100000 
nonce: 1234 
Save
timestamp_start
Do sanity checks on
parameters
Are parameters
valid?
Run commands to
obtain response info
Construct response
Save timestamp_end
Sign response
Add resulting
signature s to the
response structure
Return response Return errorresponse
NO
YES
If any command fails
Figure 20: Behaviour of the trust agent upon receiving a request
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header with a nonce, which is used to prevent replay attacks. Figure 20 shows the
behaviour of the trust agent upon receiving a request. It will store a timestamp when
it starts processing the request, verify the parameters received, run the necessary
commands in the platform to obtain the information requested, construct a response,
store a timestamp when it is done processing, sign the response and return the
response with the signature to the requester.
Field Description
nonce Nonce received in the request header
command Kind of information to request, e.g. identity, capabilities or quote
key_handle Key handle on the TPM used to sign the response
timestamp_start Indicates when the request was received by the trust agent
timestamp_end Indicates when the processing of the request ended
signature Signature of the response object by the key indicated in the request
Table 12: Basic fields in a trust agent response
All responses from the endpoint are JSON objects that include at least the fields
described in Table 12. Depending on the endpoint, more fields are included in
the response. Table 13 shows the extra fields included in responses from different
endpoints.
Endpoint Response Field Description
identity identity Dictionary that contains the identity informa-tion, usually EK and AK
extra_data Dictionary that contains additional identity in-
formation (e.g. system and kernel information)
capabilities capabilities Dictionary that contains the capabilities re-
ported by the TPM (includes fixed properties,
variable properties, commands, algorithms, ecc
curves and several TPM handles)
quote quote Dictionary that contains the quote structure re-turned by the TPM
pcrs Dictionary that contains the current value of the
PCRs
keys key Contains the public key requested
get_ev expected_value Contains the expected value for the requested
PCRs
Table 13: Extra fields in a trust agent response
5.2.2 Boot agent
The boot agent is a script implemented using Python, which reports a boot event
to the attestation server whenever the element is powered on/off. The boot agent
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is deployed as a oneshot systemd service. When the service is started, it reports a
START boot event. Similarly, when the service is stopped, it reports a STOP boot
event.
5.3 Provisioning tools
After adding the machine to be monitored by the attestation server, we need to
provision it for using the machine agents. We store the configuration for the machine
agents in the NVRAM of the TPM and seal them against a set of PCRs, so the agents
can only be used when the platform is in a correct state. When we store information
in the NVRAM of the TPM and seal it against a PCR, this information can only be
read again if the PCR contains the same value as it had when the information was
written.
The configuration stored in NVRAM for the trust agent includes the key handles for
the EK and AK in the TPM and the hashing algorithm to be used by the TPM. For
the boot agent, we store the ID of the element in the database.
Appendix F shows the code details for provisioning the machine. We wrote a Python
library that does the provisioning for the element. Figure 21 shows the provisioning
tools being run in one of our machines.
Figure 21: Provisioning of an element
When sealing the configuration for the machine agents, any PCR can be used. One
possibility is to seal the configuration of the agents against the measurement of the
agent code. We can create a new SELinux type and use it to tag the agent files.
Later, we can create a Linux IMA policy, which measures the files and stores the
integrity value over those measurements in a specific PCR, e.g. PCR 14. During
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machine provisioning, we can seal the agent configuration against PCR 14. If the
code of any of the agents is modified, both the measurement for the file and the
integrity value stored in PCR 14 will change.
This provisioning stage aims to prevent the situation in which an attacker would
modify the code of the machine agents and provide false information to the attestation
server. We seal the configuration needed for the agents to work properly against the
measurement of the actual code of the agents. Therefore, if the code of the agents is
modified in any way, these agents will no longer be able to retrieve their configuration
in order to communicate with the attestation server.
5.4 Attestation server and database
The attestation database was implemented in MongoDB 13, and it is only accessible by
using the attestation server as an intermediary. The attestation server is implemented
as a Flask server using Python 2.7, which exposes a REST API. Table 14 shows the
defined endpoints for the attestation server API.
The /check_element_trust is used to request the attestation server to evaluate the
trust status of an element by running a ruleset against the element and a policy set.
The HTTP request should include a JSON object with parameters for this action.
The parameters are: ID of the element, ID of the ruleset, ID of the policy set and
a boolean that indicates whether the attestation server should requote the element
before running the ruleset or not.
The /take_quote endpoint is used to ask the attestation server to quote an element.
The HTTP request should include a JSON object with parameters for this action.
The parameters are: ID of the element and ID of the policy set. This will trigger
interaction with the trust agent of the element to retrieve a fresh quote.
The /elements endpoint is used to obtain a list of known elements in the database
and to add new elements. It can receive GET and POST requests. A GET request will
retrieve all the elements known to the attestation server. A POST request includes a
JSON object with the following parameters: name, openstack ID, IP address, TPM
EK, TPM AK, system information, ID of default policy set, ID of default ruleset, a
list of kind tags and trust status. The server response includes the ID of the element
in the database.
The /elements/(element_id) endpoint is used to obtain details of a particular
element, update the information of an element or delete an element from the database.
It can receive GET, PUT and DELETE requests. A GET request will get the details of
the element indicated in the URL. A PUT request includes a JSON object with the
parameters and new values. A DELETE request will delete the record of this element
13https://www.mongodb.com/
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URL Operation Description
/check_element_trust POST Runs a ruleset
against a policy set
/take_quote POST Quotes an element
against a policy set
/elements GET, POST, PUT,
DELETE
Used to manage
elements in the
database
/elements/(element_id)/capabilities GET Gets the capabili-
ties for a specific el-
ement
/events GET, POST Used to obtain ex-
isting events or cre-
ate new ones
/elements/(element_id)/events GET Gets the events for
a specific element
/policies/(policy_id)/events GET Gets the events for
a specific policy
/policy_sets/(policy_set_id)/events GET Gets the events for
a specific policy set
/policies GET, POST, PUT,
DELETE
Used to manage
policies in the
database
/policy_sets GET, POST, PUT,
DELETE
Used to manage
policy sets in the
database
/quotes GET, POST,
DELETE
Used to manage
quotes in the
database
/elements/(element_id)/quotes GET Gets the quotes for
a specific element
/rulesets GET, POST, PUT,
DELETE
Used to manage
rulesets in the
database
Table 14: Attestation server REST API endpoints
in the database.
The /elements/(element_id)/capabilities endpoint accepts GET requests. This
endpoint will trigger an interaction with the trust agent of the element to obtain a
capability report.
The /events endpoint is used to obtain a list of known events in the database and to
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add new events. It can receive GET and POST requests. A GET request will retrieve all
the events known to the attestation server. A POST request includes a JSON object
with the necessary parameters to create an event in the database. The parameters
in the request will depend on the type of event being created. Section 4.8 includes
the fields that each kind of element must have. The server response includes the ID
of the event in the database.
The /events/(event_id) endpoint accepts GET requests and is used to obtain
details of a particular event. The /elements/(element_id)/events endpoint ac-
cepts GET requests and is used to obtain all events for a specific element. The
/policies/(policy_id)/events endpoint accepts GET requests and is used to ob-
tain all events for a specific policy. The /policy_sets/(policy_set_id)/events
endpoint accepts GET requests and is used to obtain all events for a specific policy
set.
The /policies endpoint is used to obtain a list of known policies in the database
and to add new policies. It can receive GET and POST requests. A GET request will
retrieve all the policies known to the attestation server. A POST request includes a
JSON object with the following parameters: name, pcrs, expected value and kind.
The server response includes the ID of the policy in the database.
The /policies/(policy_id) endpoint is used to obtain details of a particular policy,
update the information of a policy or delete a policy from the database. It can
receive GET, PUT and DELETE requests. A GET request will get the details of the policy
indicated in the URL. A PUT request includes a JSON object with the parameters and
new values. A DELETE request will delete the record of this policy in the database.
The /policy_sets endpoint is used to obtain a list of known policy sets in the
database and to add new policy sets. It can receive GET and POST requests. A GET
request will retrieve all the policy sets known to the attestation server. A POST
request includes a JSON object with the following parameters: name, list of policy
IDs and kind. The server response includes the ID of the policy set in the database.
The /policy_sets/(policy_set_id) endpoint is used to obtain details of a partic-
ular policy set, update the information of a policy set or delete a policy set from the
database. It can receive GET, PUT and DELETE requests. A GET request will get the
details of the policy set indicated in the URL. A PUT request includes a JSON object
with the parameters and new values. A DELETE request will delete the record of this
policy set in the database.
The /quotes endpoint is used to obtain a list of known quotes in the database and
to add new quotes. It can receive GET and POST requests. A GET request will retrieve
all the quotes known to the attestation server. A POST request includes a JSON
object with the following parameters: ID of the element, kind, ID of the policy, quote
and pcr values. The server response includes the ID of the quote in the database.
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The /quotes/(quote_id) endpoint is used to obtain details of a particular quote or
delete a quote from the database. It can receive GET and DELETE requests. A GET
request will get the details of the quote indicated in the URL. A DELETE request will
delete the record of this quote in the database. The /elements/(element_id)/quotes
endpoint accepts GET requests and is used to obtain all quotes for a specific element.
The /rulesets endpoint is used to obtain a list of known rulesets in the database
and to add new rulesets. It can receive GET and POST requests. A GET request will
retrieve all the rulesets known to the attestation server. A POST request includes a
JSON object with the following parameters: name, name of the python class that
implements the rule, list of rules it depends on and kind. The server response includes
the ID of the ruleset in the database.
The /rulesets/(ruleset_id) endpoint is used to obtain details of a particular
ruleset, update the information of a ruleset or delete a ruleset from the database.
It can receive GET, PUT and DELETE requests. A GET request will get the details of
the ruleset indicated in the URL. A PUT request includes a JSON object with the
parameters and new values. A DELETE request will delete the record of this ruleset
in the database.
5.5 Attestation libraries
The attestation server exposes a REST API that can be used to retrieve information
from it. We have implemented a set of attestation libraries in Python 2.7. These
libraries manage the HTTP request interactions with the attestation server and
perform error handling. This abstracts away the HTTP layer from the user, which
can now communicate with the attestation server by using python functions.
For each item in the attestation database, we define an item manager, which im-
plements functionality such as creation, deletion, update and retrieval of the items
from/to/in the database. The manager knows how to communicate with the attesta-
tion database and abstracts those details away from the user of the libraries.
Additionally, we define a Python class representation of each type of item in our
database. Therefore, when using the attestation libraries, we can deal with objects
instead of plain dictionaries or JSON structures. Figure 22 shows an example
interaction using the attestation libraries. In this case, the user wants to obtain all
the quotes in the attestation server. It creates a QuoteManager instance, and uses
the get_quotes() function. The attestation libraries will abstract away the request
exchange with the attestation server and return an instance of the class QuoteList,
which contains instances of the Quote class.
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create QuoteManager
call QuoteManager.get_quotes()
Actor
GET /quotes
return QuoteList
Attestation
Libraries
return 
{"quotes": [ {...}, {...} ] }
Attestation
Server
Figure 22: Example of attestation library usage
5.6 Attestation UI
The attestation UI provides a web dashboard for the system administrator. It
shows an overview of the trust status of the elements in the cloud. Additionally,
it can interact with the attestation server to trigger quoting or trust checks. It is
implemented as a Flask server using Python 2.7. In the UI, we can find different
pages for each relevant part of the system. This section describes the most relevant
views of the attestation UI.
Figure 23: Attestation UI element view
Figure 23 shows the elements view of the attestation UI. This view includes details
on all the elements monitored by the attestation server as well as the trust status.
When any of these elements is clicked, it displays a new page with all the element
details known by the attestation server. From that page, it is possible to trigger a
quote or trust check for the element, view the events or quotes for that element and
view a monitoring page with details of the trust status of the element over time.
The UI also provides a view with the details for the policies and policy sets known
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to the attestation server. Another view is dedicated to all the quotes stored by the
attestation server for all elements monitored. Similarly, we include a view, which
includes the events reported to the attestation server. On the next view, we find
information about the rules used in the attestation server for trust checks. Finally,
the cloud health view provides a quick visual overview of the trust status of the cloud,
by using pie charts that indicate the amount of trusted and untrusted elements in
the cloud.
5.7 Use cases
In this section, we examine a set of important use cases for our system. We describe
how to add elements to be monitored by the attestation server, how to obtain
measurements from this element, how to check the trust status of an element and,
finally, how to use our RCA mechanism to investigate attestation failures.
5.7.1 Introduce new element for monitoring
introduce element with 
IP: 10.144.104.19 
name: "compute" 
openstack ID: 4d4542b2 
return identity 
Trust Agent
return {"element_id": "5b4894d419af5157a0f61260"} 
Attestation Server
get identity of element
introduce new element (POST /elements)
return ID of element 
("5b4894d419af5157a0f61260") 
Attestation Libraries
construct request  
for the attestation 
server 
provision configurations 
in NVRAM for trust 
and boot agent 
Figure 24: Interaction between attestation components to introduce a new element
The attestation libraries include a tool for introducing a new element to be monitored
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by the attestation server. Figure 24 describes the interaction between the administra-
tor, the attestation library, the trust agent in the element and the attestation server
when introducing a new machine. The administrator uses the tool provided by the
attestation libraries to introduce a machine with IP address “10.144.104.19”, name
“compute” and openstack ID “4d4542b2”. Then, the attestation libraries interact
with the /identity endpoint of the trust agent to obtain the identifying information
of the element (EK, AK and system information). With all the information about the
element, the attestation libraries generate an HTTP POST request to the attestation
server to create a new element.
1 {
2 "name": "compute",
3 "openstack_id": "4d4542b2",
4 "ip": "10.144.104.19",
5 "ek": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\
nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAh6V2QY/i15sdHj+U4Y9r\
nWSUU6jejZPScL+8K0LWrCxQmEycLGTNMwXw4f0TabeIKPpY2BcmWRKWJ7c2a/b4v\
np7exqgYGBru0B//qdrZvcth1OKEZUsrIFYGvORjUfaSAoMiB4LQkqpEf/1jxO/zI\
n6EanTHm1oN/qqHh2AkKHJUJ2rQUobwE+2wxEmvnW7AVD67xliBfGczC9LDbwDOag\
nDalbLRLeiFt1qTj23tDhJGjtYqKvLMBTp4mzBukAqnuEEU+GwX8/Bdy7NPGQE/GV\
nXvfB0q6XHHgn8EQSNTNszPUwMhPRgbL3mJ8NWoQ+BuNSdnifC7+M3WCfI0TVUePb\n/QIDAQAB
\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n\n",
6 "ak": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\
nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmZtDWjzQFuZPiqkDLOJh\
nF3kWsu0pXT1zzjwDkbMBYtVnZB99c4w8afG5hQWNswqaDg/tikB55vJ7tS94tPM8\nT/
CvWt0qLoR0z8Pg1o+V2WcTJEnqYi/X9Rs0e9jNNRzrp40LquRR6BCJIwt9tDvW\
n4GnU2AEDpRDodUGYUsN4tN84sYLesDKCZcVjEInxBidWoA4CUPdJ3NexZAIgYRFs\
nXgi3joPTYne2ySKhKpTV8g7rkO9Jjkfd7EE0OvvPx4aQ2ke0tWBGDi+HwTrBMOzS\
nNRKo5mNnS32H9cl0yeaC6qkAio2LvbwhJMELlAAOmgmAAEc4P0fSwgqZJDkXfhUm\nmwIDAQAB
\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n\n",
7 "uname": "Linux compute 4.10.0-42-generic #46-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 4 14:38:01 UTC
2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux",
8 "policies": [],
9 "kinds": ["NFVIElement::TpmMachine"],
10 "status": False,
11 "ruleset_id": null,
12 }
Listing 1: POST request parameters to create a new element
Listing 1 shows the body of the POST request sent to the attestation server. The
attestation server adds the new element to the database and returns the ID of the
element. The attestation libraries will then run the provisioning functions for the
element. After the element has been provisioned, the tools return the element ID
to the administrator. If the element introduction was successful, the element now
appears in the attestation UI, as shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25: Attestation UI after introducing a new element
quote element e for policy set ps 
(quote_element_for_ps(e,ps)) 
return list of quote ids 
{ "quote_ids": [ ...] } 
Attestation Server
quote e for policy set ps 
(POST /take_quote 
{ "element_id": e, 
"policy_set_id": ps }) 
return list of quotes
Attestation Libraries
return quote dictionary
Trust Agent
tpm2_quote
get quote for the pcrs of policy p 
(GET /quotes/p.pcrs)
for every policy p in 
policy set ps 
create new quote q 
(POST /quotes) 
Figure 26: Interaction between attestation components to quote an element
5.7.2 Quoting an element
The attestation libraries include a tool for quoting an element monitored by the
attestation server. Figure 26 describes the interaction between a user, the attestation
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library, the trust agent in the element and the attestation server when quoting a
machine. The user that wants to trigger a quote uses the function provided by the
attestation libraries to quote an element for a policy set, if the policy set is not given
the default policy set stored for the element in the database is used. The attestation
library requests the attestation server to take quotes of the target element. Then,
the attestation server requests a quote from the trust agent for every policy in the
policy set. The attestation server accumulates a list of quote IDs and returns this list
to the attestation libraries. Finally, the attestation libraries return a list of quotes to
the user.
For convenience, the attestation UI provides the same mechanism. Figures 27, 28
and 29 show the quoting process triggered from the attestation UI. The user goes to
the page of the element, chooses a policy set and clicks the “Quote” button. The
process described earlier happens in the background. Finally, the UI prints a message
with links to the new quotes for the element.
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Figure 27: Quoting via Attestation UI (Step 1: Choose a policy set)
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Figure 28: Quoting via Attestation UI (Step 2: Click “Quote” button)
72
Figure 29: Quoting via Attestation UI (Step 3: Successfully quoted element)
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5.7.3 Check element Trtst
Optional step if 
the requote 
parameter 
is True
check trust status of element e 
against policy set ps  
and ruleset rs 
return ID of the trust 
decision event
Attestation Server
run ruleset rs against 
policy set ps 
for each policy p in ps: 
  for each rule r in rs: 
    apply(r, p) 
each rule generates an 
event in the attestation server 
update trust status of e 
with the result of running  
the ruleset 
check trust of e against rs for ps 
(POST /check_element_trust 
{ "element_id": e, 
"policy_set_id": ps, 
"ruleset_id": rs, 
"requote": True}) 
return trust decision (T/F) and 
ID of the trust decision event 
Attestation Libraries
return quote dictionary
Trust Agent
tpm2_quote
get quote for the pcrs of policy p 
(GET /quotes/p.pcrs)
for every policy p in 
policy set ps 
create new quote q 
(POST /quotes) 
Figure 30: Interaction between attestation components to check the trust of an
element
Machine trust is checked by running a ruleset against an element and a policy set.
The attestation libraries include a tool for triggering a trust check of an element
monitored by the attestation server. Figure 30 describes the interaction between a
user, the attestation library, the trust agent in the element and the attestation server
when checking the trust of an element. The user wants to check the trust status of
an element e according to a ruleset rs and a policy set ps, so he uses the attestation
libraries to trigger a trust check in the attestation server. The attestation server
receives a POST request with the ID of the element, ID of the policy set, ID of
the ruleset and a parameter that indicates whether fresh quotes should be taken. If
the ID of the policy set or ruleset is not included in the parameters, the attestation
server will use the default policy set or ruleset for the element.
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If the requote parameter was set in the request, the attestation server takes quotes of
element e for all policies in the policy set. Then, the attestation server will evaluate
the ruleset against the policy set. For every policy set, it applies every rule in the
ruleset, as described in Chapter 4, Section 4.6. Each time a rule is applied, an event
is generated in the attestation server. After evaluating the trust of the element, the
attestation server updates the trust status of the element in the database. The final
trust decision will be stored as an event in the attestation server and the attestation
server will return the ID of this event to the libraries. The libraries will return the
trust decision and the ID of the event to the user. For convenience, the attestation
UI provides the same mechanism.
5.7.4 Analyzing attestation failures
Figure 31: Attestation UI summary of a trust decision
In this section, we describe how an attestation failure is discovered and further
analyzed in the system. Figure 31 shows the detailed view provided by the attestation
UI after the trust status of an element is evaluated according a policy set and ruleset,
as described in Section 5.7.3. This summary view allows us to quickly identify what
rule in the ruleset failed. In this case, the failure was due to a mismatch between the
measurements and the expected value for the policy.
Figure 32 shows the CFT to determine the root cause of the failure and possible
mitigations. In the attestation UI, we can access the two latest quotes used to
determine platform trust, as shown in Figure 33. We can see that the ‘attested’ field
changed between quotes. By following the causes of this tree, we determine that the
attested value changed between quotes, and, by checking the element log, we see that
the element has not been updated. Therefore, the element must have received an
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Figure 32: CFT: Quote does not satisfy policy
unauthorized update. The mitigation is to check a second CFT for specific actions
depending on what PCRs changed.
Figure 35 shows the PCRs for the two latest quotes. We can see that PCR 1 changed,
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(a) First quote
(b) Second quote
Figure 33: Latest quotes for NUC2
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Figure 34: CFT: PCR 1 changed
so we check the CFT for changes on PCR 1 (Figure 34). From this tree, we determine
that the root cause of the problem is that the BIOS configurations have been changed.
Then, as a mitigation, we can check the BIOS configuration of the affected machine
and revert the settings to the correct values.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the implementation details of the different components
of the remote attestation solution introduced in Chapter 4. Additionally, we explore
in detail different use cases in the system.
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(a) PCRs for the first quote
(b) PCRs for the second quote
Figure 35: PCRs for the latest quotes for NUC2
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6 Discussion and Results
This chapter presents an evaluation of the solution designed and implemented in this
thesis using the identified problems in research from Chapter 3 as our evaluation
criteria. Additionally, we evaluate the performance of the system and discuss changes
that can be done to improve it. Finally, we compare remote attestation to whitelisting
systems.
6.1 Evaluation
This section evaluates the implementation of this solution with regards to the
problems in existing research identified in Chapter 3.
Run-time Integrity We address this problem by providing a mechanism that
allows us to monitor critical files in the filesystem and detect if they have been
modified. Furthermore, our proof of concept includes sealing the configurations for a
component to a specific platform state. We implemented this option for securing
the code of the trust agent in this work. This idea can easily be extended to protect
the configuration files needed for OpenStack or the hypervisor running on the NFVI
element. Therefore, these components will only work properly if their configuration
has not been tampered with. The author in [55] includes an example of how this
mechanism can be used to achieve trust in NFV MANO elements by sealing their
configurations to a PCR value that stores the measurements for those configuration
files.
In our approach, we utilize Linux IMA to measure specific files in our system and
store an integrity value over these measurements in the TPM. We measure files that
should not change during the lifecycle of the device. A change in the monitored files
is detected when the integrity value stored in the PCR differs from the expected
value. An enhancement to this approach would be to let the trust agent report
to the attestation server the list of file measurements. Therefore, we could detect
specifically which file was changed. In our thesis, the attestation server runs as a
systemd service. However, the list of measurements taken by IMA are kept in the
Linux securityfs14, which is only accessible by root. We decided not to implement
this functionality for security reasons, since it would require our trust agent to run
with root privileges to be able to retrieve the IMA measurement list, thus opening
an attack vector for privilege escalation on our devices.
Trustworthiness history We have created a system, which keeps a historic log
of both the measurements taken for a platform and the trust decisions taken over
14https://lwn.net/Articles/153366/
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those measurements. Furthermore, we provide a dashboard for the administrator to
easily view how the trust status of the system has changed during its lifecycle. This
dashboard includes information about the trust status over time and relevant fields
of the quote, such as the number of reboots and the clock value. Figure 36 shows
the attestation health dashboard for a specific machine in the system. This view of
the attestation UI allows us to examine how the trust has evolved over time.
Limited definition of trust We have defined a rule system comprising a set of
rules defined over the different fields of a quote. These rules utilize the policies
defined in the attestation server to determine the correctness of the measurements
obtained. Additionally, they may evaluate the changes in other parts of the quote,
to detect any deviation from what is considered normal behaviour. These rules are
combined into rulesets, which represent the definition of trust for an element.
Furthermore, these rulesets are extensible, which means that new rules can be created
to handle new situations. As a result, we obtain a system that can easily adapt to
new definitions of trust. This is particularly useful when we have machines that
appear to misbehave, but do so in an expected way, as described in Chapter 4,
Section 4.7.1. The resources provided by these faulty machines can still be leveraged,
since the system allows us to introduce new rules to manage these situations.
Considering other systems Our attestation server is designed to record infor-
mation about different events happening in the system. This mechanism is designed
in a generic way, so the attestation server can track events that originate from a
monitored device, as well as events originating from different components in the
system, including NFV MANO components, path management systems and intrusion
detection systems. At the proof of concept level, we evaluated the use of update and
reboot events reported by the trust agent in the monitored device. The rulesets used
to define trust for an element can consider these events when evaluating platform
trust, as described in Chapter 4, Section 4.6. Although, in this work, we only used
events reported by the devices themselves, the event system was designed to be
extensible, so it can handle events from external systems.
Platform resilience The rule system introduced in this thesis is composed of
rulesets. These rulesets represent differnt levels of trust depening on the rules and
the amount of rules included in each ruleset. Furthermore, we can define a partial
order over these rulesets based on their strictness, which provides us with a trust
hierarchy.
Each trust decision for an element in the system is made against a ruleset and a
policy set. Therefore, both current and previous trust statuses for a machine can
always be linked to a level of trust in the hierarchy. This allows any application that
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Figure 36: Attestation health dashboard in the attestation UI
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uses the attestation results from the attestation server to determine how trusted
their machines are based on the trust hierarchy defined by the rulesets. Depending
on the level of trust, the application can decide what they allow the machine to
do. For example, OpenStack, based on the trust level of a machine, can decide if
it is enough to allow it to run a specific virtual workload. In addition, if the trust
level is not acceptable, the attestation server allows triggering a new trust decision
evaluation based on a stricter ruleset.
Analysis of attestation failures Finally, by using RCA techniques, we have
defined a set of diagrams (CFTs and Ishikawa), which can be used to identify the
causes of known system failures. We summarized the identified known failures and
their causes in 11 CFTs and 8 Ishikawa diagrams at the proof of concept level.
These diagrams can be used as tools to understand system behaviour after failures.
Furthermore, they can be mapped to mitigations or actions to be taken when a
failure is identified.
As far as we know, this is the first set of tools created to aid in computer forensics
for attestation failures. This work introduces the diagrams as tools to be used by
an administrator, and it is the first step towards developing a complete framework
for attestation forensics. In the future, the analysis of attestation failures could be
automated; however, this automation is considered out of scope for this thesis.
6.1.1 Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the proposed solution in terms of performance. We
measured the time taken to evaluate the trust for an element in the system. To
evaluate the trust of an element, we requoted the element for fresh measurements
and ran a ruleset. We tested all the rulesets defined in this work against an element
in the system. This element was associated with a policy set containing four policies;
therefore, each time we requote, we request four separate quotes from the trust agent
on the device: one for each policy.
The process of evaluating the trust of an element comprises three main steps:
1. Requoting the element.
2. Running the ruleset.
3. Interacting with the attestation server (obtaining element and policy informa-
tion, storing quotes, reporting trust decision events, etc)
Figure 37 shows the measurement results. We include a time breakdown by each
step in the trust evaluation process, so we can evaluate which step takes the most
time. Similarly, Table 15 contains the measurements taken.
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Figure 37: Performance evaluation: running rulesets
We can see that, for rulesets which contain less than 20 rules, requoting the element
represents most of the time used for evaluating trust. Therefore, we decided to
analyze the quoting process, to discover what operations took the longest time to run.
When a trust agent receives a request for a quote, it must run a set of commands to
obtain the necessary information to build the response. The main steps for building
a quote response from the trust agent are:
1. Taking the quote (tpm2_quote).
2. Obtaining the current PCR values (tpm2_pcrlist).
3. Hashing and signing the response of the trust agent with a key from the TPM
(tpm2_hash and tpm2_sign)
4. Extra processing of the data in the trust agent (receiving a request, building a
response, etc.)
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Ruleset Numberof rules
Total
Runtime
Runtime Breakdown
Quoting Ruleset
runtime
Interaction
with AS
Minimal 5 s 22.58 s 20 s 1.19 s 1.39 s
Minimal
+ Clock
Increasing
6 s 22.83 s 20 s 1.44 s 1.39 s
Minimal
+ Clock
Integrity
10 s 23.14 s 20 s 2.18 s 0.96 s
Extended 18 s 25.35 s 20 s 3.47 s 1.88 s
Extended
+ Reboot
Compari-
son
21 s 44.37 s 20 s 12.08 s 12.29 s
Complete 51 s 134.84 s 20 s 54.72 s 60.12 s
Table 15: Runtime for each ruleset
tpm2_quote (10%)
tpm2_pcrlist (2%)
tpm2_hash (38%)
tpm2_sign (49%)
trust agent processing (1%)
Figure 38: Performance evaluation: obtain quote from trust agent (time breakdown)
Figure 38 shows the time breakdown for obtaining a single quote for an element
from the trust agent. 87% of the time used to obtain a quote is used for hashing and
signing the response from the trust agent. Cryptographic operations on the TPM
are slow, since it is not designed to be a cryptoaccelerator.
In this situation, we have a tradeoff between performance and security. To improve
the performance of the trust agent, we could omit the signing of the complete response
85
sent by the trust agent and rely solely on the signature for the TPM2 quote structure.
However, we could no longer guarantee that other information in the response, such
as the PCR registers, reported by the trust agent have not been tampered with. At
the proof of concept level, we decided to focus on the security aspect.
Additionally, Figure 37 shows that for larger rulesets, the interaction with the
trust agent and the ruleset runtime represent a higher percentage of the time spent
evaluating platform trust. As the amount of rules increases, so does the computing
complexity and the communication with the attestation server. As each rule in the
ruleset is run, events are sent to the attestation server for recording a log of the
intermediate results, which increases the amount of time spent sending requests to
the attestation server. One way to improve the performance, would be to only report
the final result to the attestation server. However, by doing so, we lose the ability to
inspect intermediate results upon an attestation failure, which makes the attestation
forensics process difficult.
6.2 Remote attestation and whitelisting systems
A large amount of research has gone into identifying the challenges and threats in
NFV [17, 44, 38, 35, 11]. Most of the attacks on NFV stem from the virtualization
vulnerabilities and threats to network functions. Many of them will use known
vulnerabilities as the infection vector for attacking and tampering with the system.
One approach to prevent attacks due to vulnerabilities in software (e.g. outdated
hypervisors) is to use a whitelisting system, such as a package manager, which contains
a list of packages/software signed by a trusted third party, which is considered safe
to use. One may think that having such system in place would render measured boot
and remote attestation useless. However, there are two reasons why this is not the
case. First, measured boot allows us to reason over the status of the hardware of
the platform, which we cannot do with the code repository, since it only controls
software that runs on top of the OS, so anything before the OS in the boot chain is
potentially harmful. Also, whitelisting systems may fail. These package repositories
(e.g. windows software center, app stores, etc.) are based on the use of signed
cryptographic certificates of the code by a trusted third party. However, there are
situations in which malware may appear to be legitimate, because it is signed with
proper keys. There is a market for code signing keys which sell for X amount of
money in the dark web [28, 30]. These would allow malicious attackers to sign code
which contains malware and it would go undetected by the whitelisting systems.
Since whitelisting systems are not foolproof, we consider them a complementary
technology to remote attestation and measured boot. These should be combined to
provide guarantees that the integrity of the system is not compromised. For example,
even if a whitelisting/patch management system is set in place, we can still use
remote attestation and system measurements to verify that the correct code is being
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updated/installed and not just an update that appears to be valid because it was
signed by a trusted key (as explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.4).
Although most of the infection vectors for malicious code are known vulnerabilities,
there is still the possibility that a malicious attacker exploits a zero-day vulnerability to
attack the system (e.g. install a rootkit or APT). In this situation, remote attestation
may be useful to detect changes in the system and investigate the problems. Also,
we have found research that combines trusted computing technologies and APT
detection to trick the attacker that installs APT to carry out their attack while
notifying the administrator so that mitigations can be set in place or even investigate
how the attack is carried out after the infiltration stage [6].
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated the work in this thesis with regards to both the identified
limitations of existing research and performance. For the performance evaluation,
we discussed alternatives to increase the performance of the system. Finally, we
analyzed how remote attestation and whitelisting systems are related, as well as how
they can be combined to improve the security of our system.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis and outlines different areas this work can extend
to in the future. We summarize the research aims and results of this thesis. Finally,
we introduce different areas of research this work can be extended to.
7.1 Conclusions
This thesis has managed to identify weaknesses in existing remote attestation schemes
and use them as motivation to design and implement a new remote attestation solution.
The main motivation behind this work is to improve the concept of trust in NFV.
This thesis focuses on trust in the underlying NFVI layer of NFV, since this is the
building block for establishing trust at higher levels.
We extend the measurements we can obtain from a system to include run-time
measurements, by providing a mechanism to measure files in the filesystem. This
mechanism, combined with TPM, allows us to detect changes in critical files at
runtime. Furthermore, we defined a mechanism to seal the configuration needed by
our agents running on the monitored machines to platform state. Therefore, those
agents can only run correctly if the platform is a correct state.
Additionally, we have designed and implemented an attestation server, which can
store historic information about the devices it monitors. This historic information
includes measurements, events and trust decisions.
To improve the existing definition of trust, we designed a rule system on our attestation
server, which evaluates platform trust according to rulesets. These rulesets utilize the
measurements from the devices, as well as events stored in the attestation server to
determine if an element is trusted or not. Existing work only considers PCR values
when evaluating trust. In contrast, the rules in our rule system reason over the PCR
values, as well as the extra metadata included in TPM 2.0 quotes. Our rule system
reasons over the quotes in a temporal manner, evaluating how the fields in the quotes
have changed over time. Additionally, it takes into consideration the events that
have happened in the system and how those may have affected the quotes. The
introduction of our rule system allows us to have a finer-grained definition of trust.
Additionally, the rules in our rule system are extensible, which gives the system the
flexibility to adapt to new system requirements, as well as known misbehaviours.
Another benefit of our rule system is that the rule sets that compose it can be ordered
according to strictness, which, effectively, produces a trust hierarchy. The trust
hierarchy allows us to evaluate different machines according to different definitions of
trust. We can use the stricter definitions of trust to determine what devices should
run critical workload. By allowing for weaker definitions of trust, we can still use the
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resources of machines that would be considered untrusted by other remote attestation
schemes, e.g. by allowing them to run non-critical workload.
Finally, by means of root cause analysis, we identified a set of causal factor trees and
Ishikawa diagrams that illustrate the common causes for failures in our platforms.
These diagrams can be used as a tool in attestation forensics to investigate the causes
of failures. Furthermore, the root causes of the failures can be mapped to mitigations
to handle the erroneous state.
7.2 Future work
In this section, we outline different directions this work can take in the future.
This work focuses on trust at the NFVI layer of the NFV architecture. The concepts
introduced in this work, such as the rule system, event system and RCA trees, can be
extended to the VNF and MANO levels. The attestation server is designed in such
a way that it would be possible for it to monitor elements from other layers of the
NFV architecture. The rule system can be extended with new rules that define trust
for those different levels of the architecture. This would extend the finer-grained
definition of trust to other components of NFV.
In this thesis, we discussed how the attestation server can integrate with external
systems. The attestation server can be extended by creating a trust graph, with
the information of which elements trust each other. The information in this trust
graph can be utilized by external mechanisms. For example, if two elements do not
match the required level of trust, then, we can introduce fallback mechanisms, such
as altering the routing network graph to provide safer routing [34, 33].
The RCA tools presented in this work are at an early stage. Future work includes
automating the analysis of attestation failures. We can create an automated system
that takes a trust failure, evaluates what the possible root cause is according to
known rules (the defined trees) and triggers mitigations accordingly.
Finally, the remote attestation process can be distributed to all the machines in the
system. By using longer term identities [5] for the elements and distributed ledger
technology (e.g. Blockchain) to store attestation information, we can distribute the
functionality of the attestation server to the elements. Therefore, each element can
request any other element to quote itself and the trust status of an element can be
requested from the distributed ledger.
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A Static Rules
In our rule system, we define six static rules.
A.1 Correct attested value
This rule compares the ‘attested’ field of the quote to the expected value stored in
the attestation database for the policy this quote is for. The ‘attested’ field contains
a digest of the contents of the given PCRs. The policy for this quote stores the pcrs
and the expected ‘attested’ value for that PCR combination.
correctAttestedValue(q, p) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.attested = p.expectedV alueFalse, otherwise (A1)
Given an element e, a quote q and a policy p for q, and assuming that e follows p,
we define the logic of the rule in Equation A1. The rule will be satisfied when the
attested value matches the expected value, and it will fail when it does not match.
A.2 Valid signature
This rule checks the validity of the ‘signature’ field of a quote. Every quote includes
a signature value, which is a signature over the returned quote structure by the
attestation key of the element [49]. The attestation database stores the public
attestation key for all elements in the system.
validSignature(e, q, s) =
⎧⎨⎩True, verifySignature(q, s, e.ak)False, otherwise (A2)
Therefore, given an element e, a quote q for e and a signature s for q, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation A2. The rule will be satisfied if s is a valid signature for
q using e.ak, it fails when the signature cannot be verified. The attestation key is
unique for every TPM. If a quote for an element is not signed by the attestation key
registered to the element, we cannot guarantee that the element’s TPM generated
this quote, which would make the element untrusted.
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A.3 Valid safe value
When an element is quoted, the quote includes a ‘clock’ and a ‘safe’ field. The clock
of the TPM should increase monotonically. However, there are cases in which the
clock may appear to go backwards. This can happen when there is a power outage
or some other kind of non-orderly shutdown. The safe value in the quote indicates
whether the reported clock value is a new value or a repeat of any previously reported
value [49]. Safe is set to 1 when the clock integrity is reliable and 0 otherwise.
validSafeValue(q) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.safe = 1False, otherwise (A3)
Given an element e and a quote q for e, we define the logic of the rule in Equation
A3. This rule will be satisfied when the reported safe value for a quote is reliable.
A.4 Invalid safe value
This rule is defined to handle the situation in which the clock appears to go backwards,
and the TPM has set the safe value to 0 to indicate that the clock value may be
unreliable. This rule is meant to be used in conjunction with a temporal rule that
checks whether the clock is increasing or not.
invalidSafeValue(q) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.safe = 0False, otherwise (A4)
Given an element e and a quote q for e, we define the logic of the rule in Equation
A4. This rule will be satisfied when the reported safe value for a quote is unreliable.
A.5 Valid type value
The ‘type’ field of a quote indicates that this is an attestation structure. For a
TPM2_Quote, the type value is defined as 0x8018 [50]. If the type value is anything
other than 0x8018, this may be an indicator that the structure generated by the
TPM is not a quote or that the quote was somehow forged.
validTypeValue(q) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.type = 0x8018False, otherwise (A5)
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Given an element e and a quote q for e, we define the logic of the rule in Equation
A5. This rule will be satisfied when the quote contains the correct type value, and it
will fail otherwise.
A.6 Valid magic value
The ‘magic’ value of a quote indicates that the structure was generated by a TPM.
This value is always 0xFF′TCG′ [50]. If the magic value is anything other than the
aforementioned value, this may be an indicator that the quote was not generated by
a TPM.
validMagicValue(q) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.magic = 0xFF′TCG′False, otherwise (A6)
Given an element e and a quote q for e, we define the logic of the rule in Equation
A6. This rule will be satisfied when the quote contains the correct magic value, and
it will fail otherwise.
A.7 Valid firmware
The ‘firmware’ value of a quote indicates the firmware version for that element’s
TPM. We have a set of known firmware values that the TPMs can have. If the
firmware value is not one of the known values for the TPMs in our elements, this
may indicate some kind of tampering.
validFirmware(q, F ) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.firmware ∈ FFalse, otherwise (A7)
Given a quote e and a set of known firmware values F , we define the logic of the rule
in Equation A7. This rule will be satisfied when the firmware value for the TPM
reported by the quote is in the set of known values, and it will fail otherwise.
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B Temporal Rules
In our rule system, we define twenty-one temporal rules.
B.1 Magic value not changed
This rule checks that the magic value has not changed from one quote to another.
magicNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.magic = q′.magicFalse, otherwise (B1)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B1. This rule will be satisfied when the magic value has
not changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does change.
B.2 Type value not changed
This rule checks that the type value has not changed from one quote to another.
typeNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.type = q′.typeFalse, otherwise (B2)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B2. This rule will be satisfied when the type value has
not changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does change.
B.3 Firmware version not changed
In the static rules, we check that the firmware version reported by a quote is one of
the known firmware versions for our TPMs. The firmware version of a TPM should
not change from one quote to another without a good reason. If the firmware version
changed, this means someone has updated the firmware on the machine, which is
not considered normal behaviour. This rule checks that the firmware version is the
same between two quotes.
firmwareNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.firmware = q′.f irmwareFalse, otherwise (B3)
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Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B3. This rule will be satisfied when the firmware value
has not changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does change.
B.4 Qualified signer not changed
A quote includes a field called ‘qualifiedSigner’, which indicates the name of the key
used to sign the quote [49]. In our system, the Attestation Key of the TPM is used
to sign the quote. Since we do not ask the TPM to sign attestation data with any
other key, we expect the qualified signer to be the same for every quote.
qualifiedSignerNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.qualifiedSigner = q′.qualifiedSignerFalse, otherwise
(B4)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B4. This rule will be satisfied when the qualified signer
value has not changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does change.
B.5 Clock Rules
TPMs keep a time value in volatile memory and periodically stores a copy of it on
NV memory [49]. Quotes report this time value on their ‘clock’ field. The clock value
is monotonically increasing. If a quote reports a clock value that is lower than that
of a previous quote, this may indicate that the element has suffered a non-orderly
shutdown.
We define two rules that can be used to evaluate the status of the TPM clock. In
most cases, the clock is expected to increase.
clockIncreased(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.clock < q′.clockFalse, otherwise (B5)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B5. This rule will be satisfied when the clock has
increased between two quotes, and it will fail if it stays the same or decreases.
We define a second rule over the clock, which checks if the clock has decreased. It
can be used in conjunction with other rules to detect situations in which elements
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are not properly shut down.
clockDecreased(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.clock > q′.clockFalse, otherwise (B6)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B6. This rule will be satisfied when the clock has
decreased between two quotes, and it will fail if it stays the same or increases.
B.6 Signature changed
Every time an element is quoted, it will report at least a different clock value.
Therefore, the signature for the quote will change from quote to quote. This rule
allows us to detect if any signature is being reused between quotes.
signatureChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.signature ̸= q′.signatureFalse, otherwise (B7)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B7. This rule will be satisfied when the signatures are
not the same, and it will fail if they are.
B.7 Reset count rules
The ‘resetCount’ field of a quote is a counter that increases every time an element
is rebooted [49]. It is reset to zero when the TPM is cleared. During the normal
lifecycle of an element, the reset count should either stay the same or increase. We
define two rules regarding the reset count, one for each possible situation: the reset
count increasing or not changing. If the reset count decreases, it may be an indicator
that the TPM was reset to the factory defaults.
B.7.1 Reset count has not changed
This rule checks that the number of reboots of the element has not changed. This
rule can be used to check that an element is operating in a normal way and has not
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been rebooted.
resetCountNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.resetCount = q′.resetCountFalse, otherwise (B8)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B8. This rule will be satisfied when the reset count has
stayed the same between two quotes, and it will fail if it changes.
B.7.2 Reset count has increased
This rule checks that the number of reboots of the element has increased. This rule
is used to verify that an element has been rebooted.
resetCountIncreased(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.resetCount < q′.resetCountFalse, otherwise (B9)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B9. This rule will be satisfied when the reset count has
increased between two quotes, and it will fail if it decreases or stays the same.
B.7.3 Reset count matches reboot events
Under normal operation, the amount of reboot events should match the reset count
difference reported by the TPM between quotes. We define a rule that can verify
this situation.
resetCountMatchesReboots(q, q′, B) =
⎧⎨⎩True (q′.resetCount− q.resetCount) = |B|False otherwise
(B10)
Given an element e and a pair of quotes for e, q and q′, assuming q was taken before
q′, we define the logic of the rule in equation B10 This rule will be satisfied when
the amount of reboots reported by an element matches the reboot events between
quotes and fail otherwise.
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B.7.4 Reset count higher reboot events
In some situations, the TPM will report a higher amount of reboots than the ones
stored in the attestation database. This may be a valid situation. For example,
portable devices, such as laptops, usually connect to networks outside the corporate
one. If a machine is rebooted outside the network, it may fail to communicate this
event to the attestation server. Even though the attestation server will not know a
reboot happened, the reboot will still be reflected in the TPM reset counter. Since
this is a known situation for a specific set of devices, we can define a rule that is
used with these devices, which would allow the reset count to be higher than the
amount of reboots.
resetCountHigherThanReboots(q, q′, B) =
⎧⎨⎩True (q′.resetCount− q.resetCount) > |B|False otherwise
(B11)
Given an element e and a pair of quotes for e, q and q′, assuming q was taken before
q′, we define the logic of the rule in equation B11 This rule will be satisfied when the
amount of reboots reported by an element is higher than the reboot events between
quotes and fail otherwise.
B.8 Restart count rules
The ‘restartCount’ field of a quote is a counter that increases when an element is
suspended or hibernated. The rules defined in this section are used to check if the
element has been suspended or hibernated.
When a TPM is started up back from hibernation, it resets all the PCRs to their
initial values and measures the boot sequence once again [49]. Therefore, it is possible
to do changes on the startup sequence, such as booting to a different kernel version
or changing BIOS settings. This field helps us detect these situations.
Additionally, some TPM chips present failures when waking up from a suspension or
hibernation state. After waking up, the TPM can no longer be used until a reboot
happens. In these kind of elements, the restart count stays the same until the next
boot, since once the device goes to sleep, it is not possible to quote it anymore before
restarting the system.
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B.8.1 Restart count not changed
This rule checks the case in which an element has not been suspended or hibernated.
restartCountNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.restartCount = q′.restartCountFalse, otherwise
(B12)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B12. This rule will be satisfied when the restart count
has not changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does change.
B.8.2 Restart count increased
This rule is used to verify that the element has been suspended or hibernated. On
machines with TPM chips that work correctly, it is acceptable behaviour to suspend
or hibernate (e.g. laptops).
restartCountIncreased(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.restartCount < q′.restartCountFalse, otherwise (B13)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B13. This rule will be satisfied when the restart count
has increased between two quotes, and it will fail if it stays the same or decreases.
B.8.3 Restart count decreased
This rule is used when the restart count decreases between quotes. This may happen
when a machine, which had previously been suspended or hibernated, is rebooted.
After the reboot, the reset count increases and the restart count is reset, which would
appear to be a decrease in the counter. This rule can be used with rule B9 to detect
this situation.
restartCountDecreased(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.restartCount > q′.restartCountFalse, otherwise
(B14)
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Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B14. This rule will be satisfied when the restart count
has decreased between two quotes, and it will fail if it stays the same or decreases.
B.9 Attested value not changed
This rule detects if the attested value has stayed the same between two quotes. For
a trusted element, we would expect for all its quotes to have a correct attested value
(rule A1), and this attested value should not change. This rule allows us to verify
the correct behaviour of the system.
attestedNotChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.attested = q′.attestedFalse, otherwise (B15)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B15. This rule will be satisfied when the attested value
has not changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does.
B.10 Attested value changed
This rule detects if the attested value has changed between two quotes. Normally,
we would expect the attested value to be correct and not change. However, if the
software on that element is updated, the attested value may change. This rule allows
us to detect this situation.
attestedChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q.attested ̸= q′.attestedFalse, otherwise (B16)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B16. This rule will be satisfied when the attested value
has changed between two quotes, and it will fail if it does not.
B.11 Quote changed
Every quote structure for an element should be different. The quote contains fields
that change every time the element is quoted, such as the clock and the signature.
This rule allows us to detect if any quote is being reported more than once. Therefore,
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a malicious actor cannot obtain one good quote and report that back to the attestation
server whenever the element is quoted.
quoteChanged(q, q′) =
⎧⎨⎩True, q ̸= q′False, otherwise (B17)
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, we define the
logic of the rule in Equation B17. This rule will be satisfied when the quotes are not
the same, and it will fail if they are.
B.12 Policy changed
Every time the expected value of a policy is changed, we store an ‘update’ event
in the attestation database. This rule reasons over the ‘update policy’ events that
may have happened between two quotes. It allows us to detect situations in which a
policy for an element has changed its expected value in the time interval between
two quotes. Combined with other rules, it allows us to reason over the changes we
encounter between quotes.
policyChanged(p, q, q′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
True, (∃ u ∈ getEvents(q.timestamp, q′.timestamp) |
u.type = ‘policy update’ ∧ u.policy = p)
False, otherwise
where:
getEvents(t, t′) = {e | t ≤ e.timestamp ≤ t′∧e is an event in the attestation database}
(B18)
Given a policy p and pair of quotes for p, q and q′, assuming q was taken before q′,
we define the logic of the rule in Equation B18. This rule will be satisfied when the
policy has been updated between quotes, and it will fail otherwise.
B.13 Policy not changed
This rule is the opposite of rule B18. It is used to verify that a policy has not been
updated between two quotes. Combined with other rules, it allows us to reason over
the changes we encounter between quotes.
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policyNotChanged(p, q, q′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
True, ¬ (∃ u ∈ getEvents(q.timestamp, q′.timestamp) |
u.type = ‘policy update’ ∧ u.policy = p)
False, otherwise
where:
getEvents(t, t′) = {e | t ≤ e.timestamp ≤ t′∧e is an event in the attestation database}
(B19)
Given a policy p and pair of quotes for p, q and q′, assuming q was taken before q′,
we define the logic of the rule in Equation B19. This rule will be satisfied when the
policy has not been updated between quotes, and it will fail otherwise.
B.14 Element updated
Every time an element is updated, we store an ‘update’ event in the attestation
database. Similar to the previous rule, this rule reasons over ‘update’ events for an
element that may have happened between two quotes. Combined with other rules,
it allows us to detect situations in which changes in a quote are due to a software
update on the element.
elementUpdated(e, q, q′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
True, (∃ u ∈ getEvents(q.timestamp, q′.timestamp) |
u.type = ‘element update’ ∧ u.element = e)
False, otherwise
where:
getEvents(t, t′) = {e | t ≤ e.timestamp ≤ t′∧e is an event in the attestation database}
(B20)
Given an element e and pair of quotes for e, q and q′, assuming q was taken before
q′, we define the logic of the rule in Equation B20. This rule will be satisfied when
the element has been updated between quotes, and it will fail otherwise.
B.15 Element not updated
This rule is the opposite of rule B20. It is used to verify that an element has not
been updated between two quotes. Combined with other rules, it allows us to reason
over the changes we encounter between quotes.
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elementNotUpdated(e, q, q′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
True, ¬ (∃ u ∈ getEvents(q.timestamp, q′.timestamp) |
u.type = ‘element update’ ∧ u.element = e)
False, otherwise
where:
getEvents(t, t′) = {e | t ≤ e.timestamp ≤ t′∧e is an event in the attestation database}
(B21)
Given an element e and pair of quotes for e, q and q′, assuming q was taken before
q′, we define the logic of the rule in Equation B21. This rule will be satisfied when
the element has not been updated between quotes, and it will fail otherwise.
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C Compound Rules
In our rule system, we define three compound rules. For simplicity, we define
compound rules as trees instead of equations, since compound rules use the results of
their children rules to determine their own. There are two kinds of compound rules:
AND and OR rules. The result of an AND rule is the logical AND operation over
the results of the children rules. Similarly, the result of an OR rule is the logical OR
operation over the result of the children rules. Each of the following rules indicates
if it is an AND or OR rule.
C.1 Clock integrity not maintained (AND Rule)
This rule is used when the clock appears to be decreasing, but the TPM has marked
the clock value as unreliable. Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was
taken before q′, Figure C1 shows the logic of the rule.
Clock integrity not maintained
(AND Rule)
invalidSafeValue(q′)
(Equation A3)
clockDecreased(q, q′)
(Equation B6)
Figure C1: Clock integrity not maintained (AND rule)
C.2 Clock increasing or integrity not maintained (OR Rule)
This rule is used during normal operation of an element. There are two situations
that may happen: the clock monotonically increases between quotes or the clock
integrity is not maintained. This rule checks that one of these conditions holds.
Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, Figure C2 shows
the logic of the rule.
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Clock integrity not maintained
(OR Rule)
Clock integrity not maintained
(AND Rule)
(Equation C1)
invalidSafeValue(q′)
(Equation A3)
clockDecreased(q, q′)
(Equation B6)
clockIncreasing(q, q′)
(Equation B5)
Figure C2: Clock increasing or integrity not maintained (OR rule)
C.3 Compound reboot rules
During the lifecycle of an element, we can identify three different situations that may
happen between two quotes.
1. Normal operation: element has neither been rebooted nor suspended between
quotes.
2. Reboot: element has been rebooted between quotes.
3. Suspend or Hibernate: element has been suspended or hibernated between
quotes.
We define a set of compound rules that allow us to detect each of these situations.
These will be used as building blocks for more detailed reasoning in other compound
rules.
C.3.1 Element has not been rebooted (AND Rule)
During normal operation an element has neither been rebooted nor suspended;
therefore, the reset and restart counters reported by the TPM should show no
changes between quotes. Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was taken
before q′, Figure C3 shows the logic of the rule.
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Element has not been rebooted
(AND Rule)
restartCountNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B12)
resetCountNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B8)
Figure C3: Element has not been rebooted (AND rule)
C.3.2 Element has been rebooted (AND Rule)
When an element is rebooted between quotes the reset counter should increase. The
restart counter may stay the same or decrease. If the machine had been previously
suspended, upon reboot, the restart counter will be reset to zero, which makes it
seem as the counter is decreasing. If the machine had not been suspended, the restart
counter will show no changes. Given a pair of quotes q and q′ and assuming q was
taken before q′, Figure C4 shows the logic of the rule.
Element has been rebooted
(AND Rule)
Restart count may have decreased
(OR Rule)
restartCountDecreased(q, q′)
(Equation B14)
restartCountNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B12)
resetCountIncreased(q, q′)
(Equation B9)
Figure C4: Element has been rebooted (AND rule)
C.3.3 Element has been suspended (AND Rule)
When an element is suspended between quotes, there will be no change in the reset
count, and the restart count will increase by at least one. Given a pair of quotes q
and q′ and assuming q was taken before q′, Figure C5 shows the logic of the rule.
111
Element has been suspended
(AND Rule)
restartCountIncreased(q, q′)
(Equation B13)
resetCountNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B8)
Figure C5: Element has been suspended (AND rule)
C.3.4 Reboot checks
We combine the previously defined rules by using an OR rule. Figure C6 shows the
new compound rule, which checks that one of the previous situations has happened
between quotes (normal operation, reboot or suspension).
Reboot checks
(OR Rule)
Element has been suspended
(AND Rule)
(Figure C5)
Element has been rebooted
(AND Rule)
(Figure C4)
Element has not been rebooted
(AND Rule)
(Figure C3)
Figure C6: Reboot checks (OR rule)
C.4 Attested value checks
There are cases in which the attested value of an element is changed, due to software
updates. We can define compound rules to handle these situations. We have identified
five different situations that may arise when evaluating the events that occurred
between quotes and their effect on the attested value reported by the TPM.
C.4.1 Normal operation
t0
q
t1
q′
time
Figure C7: Normal operation timeline
112
We assume normal operation to be the situation in which no element updates or
policy changes have happened between quotes as shown in Figure C7. In this case,
the attested value should not change and it should satisfy the policy. Figure C8
shows the logic for the rule.
Normal operation
(AND Rule)
policyNotChanged(p, q, q′)
(Equation B19)
elementNotUpdated(e, q, q′)
(Equation B21)
attestedNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B15)
correctAttestedValue(q′, p)
(Equation A1)
Figure C8: Normal operation (AND rule)
C.4.2 Element was updated and policy changed between quotes
t0
q
t1
Element update
t2
Policy update
t3
q′
time
Figure C9: Element was updated and policy changed between quotes
Figure C9 shows the case when the element gets a software update, which affects one
of its policies, and the policy is updated to reflect this change. Both updates happen
between quotes q and q′. In this situation, the attested value changes; however, since
the policy was updated, the latest quote will still satisfy the policy. Figure C10
shows the logic for the rule.
Element was updated
and policy changed between quotes
(AND Rule)
policyChanged(p, q, q′)
(Equation B18)
elementUpdated(e, q, q′)
(Equation B20)
attestedChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B16)
correctAttestedValue(q′, p)
(Equation A1)
Figure C10: Element was updated and policy changed between quotes (AND rule)
C.4.3 Element was updated between quotes and policy had already
changed
t0
Policy update
t1
q
t2
Element update
t3
q′
time
Figure C11: Element was updated between quotes and policy had already changed
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Figure C11 shows the case when the policy of an element changes before the element
is updated, which causes the first quote to not satisfy the policy anymore. Then,
between q and q′, the element is updated, which causes the quote to satisfy the policy
again. We define this rule, to cover the case in which updates are done out of order,
so the rule system knows this not a trust failure. Figure C12 shows the logic for the
rule.
Element was updated between quotes
and policy had already changed
(AND Rule)
policyNotChanged(p, q, q′)
(Equation B19)
elementUpdated(e, q, q′)
(Equation B20)
attestedChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B16)
correctAttestedValue(q′, p)
(Equation A1)
Figure C12: Element was updated between quotes and policy had already changed
(AND rule)
C.4.4 Policy was changed between quotes and element had already been
updated
t0
Element update
t1
q
t2
Policy update
t3
q′
time
Figure C13: Element was updated between quotes and policy had already changed
Figure C13 shows the case when an element is updated before the policy is changed
to reflect the update, which causes the first quote to not satisfy the policy anymore.
Then, between q and q′, the policy is updated, which causes the quote to satisfy the
policy again. We define this rule, to cover the case in which updates are done out of
order, so the rule system knows this not a trust failure. Figure C14 shows the logic
for the rule.
Policy changed between quotes
and element had already been updated
(AND Rule)
policyChanged(p, q, q′)
(Equation B18)
elementNotUpdated(e, q, q′)
(Equation B21)
attestedChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B16)
correctAttestedValue(q′, p)
(Equation A1)
Figure C14: Policy changed between quotes and element had already been updated
(AND rule)
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C.4.5 Element update does not affect policy
t0
q
t1
Element update
t2
q′
time
Figure C15: Element update does not affect policy
Figure C15 shows the case when an element is updated between quotes, but this
update does not affect the measurements evaluated by the policy. An update does
not necessarily mean a change in measurements for all the policies in the policy set of
an element. We define this rule, so the rule system knows that if there is an update
between quotes and the attested value does not change, this may be acceptable
behaviour. Figure C16 shows the logic for the rule.
Element update does
not affect policy
(AND Rule)
policyNotChanged(p, q, q′)
(Equation B19)
elementUpdated(e, q, q′)
(Equation B20)
attestedNotChanged(q, q′)
(Equation B15)
correctAttestedValue(q′, p)
(Equation A1)
Figure C16: Element update does not affect policy (AND rule)
C.4.6 Detailed checks
Finally, Figure C17 shows a rule that combines the previously introduced rules. This
compound rule can be run against an element, and it will be satisfied if the element
is in one of the five correct situations described above.
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Detailed checks
for attested value
(OR Rule)
Element update does
not affect policy
(AND Rule)
(Figure C16)
Policy changed between quotes
and element had already been updated
(AND Rule)
(Figure C14)
Element was updated between quotes
and policy had already been changed
(AND Rule)
(Figure C12)
Element was updated
and policy changed between quotes
(AND Rule)
(Figure C10)
Normal operation
(AND Rule)
(Figure C8)
Figure C17: Detailed checks for attested value (OR rule)
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D Causal Factor Trees for Root Cause Analysis
Quote does
not satisfy
policy
Attested value has
not changed
between quotes
Attested value has
changed between
quotes
Policy has not
been updated
between quotes
Policy has been
updated between
quotes
Element may have
been updated before
the two latest quotes
and the policy has
not been updated yet
The element's policy
was updated before
the element received
a software update
Element has been
updated between
quotes
Element has not
been updated
between quotes
Policy has not
been updated
between quotes
Policy has been
updated between
quotes
The element received a
software update and the
policy has not changed
to reflect this yet
The element received a
software update and the
policy was changed. The
element is reporting
incorrect measurements.
Element received
an unauthorized
software update
Figure D1: Causal Factor Tree for when a quote does not satisfy the policy
Quote
satisfies
policy
Previous
quote
satisfied
policy
All good
Previous
quote did not
satisfy policy
Policy was
updated
between
quotes
Element was
updated
between
quotes
Figure D2: Causal Factor Tree for when a quote satisfies the policy
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Reboot count
is different
from TPM's
reset count
TPM's resetCount is
less than attestation
server's reboot
count
TPM's resetCount is
greater than
attestation server's
reboot count
Element's trust
agent (systemd
services) were
restarted
manually
Element was
rebooted
outside of the
network
BIOS was
accessed
before the
element started
Element is a
server that
performs self­
checks on
startup
Element is a
portable device that
connects to
networks other than
the internal one
Figure D3: Causal Factor Tree for Reboot trust failure
PCRs changed to the
following values:
16: 000...0
17: FFF..F
18: FFF..F
Element has
been rebooted
between quotes
Element
booted without
tboot
tboot has not
been installed
on the element
Element has not
been rebooted
between quotes
Previous quote
has the same
values for
PCRs 16,17,18
Previous quote
has different
values for
PCRs 16,17,18
Unauthorized
update of PCR
tboot is
installed
Element's
ACM is
missing
Figure D4: Causal Factor Tree for a missing DRTM measurement
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PCR 0
changed
BIOS has
been
tampered
with
TPM has
been
replaced
Motherboard
has changed
Figure D5: Causal Factor Tree for a change in PCR 0
PCR 4 changed
Element's MBR
has been
updated
New grub
update
Figure D6: Causal Factor Tree for a change in PCR 4
PCR 10 has
changed
Linux IMA's
default policy is
not being used
Files measured by
the default policy of
Linux IMA have
changed
PCR 10 is 0
PCR 10 is
not 0
Figure D7: Causal Factor Tree for a change in PCR 10
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Figure D8: Causal Factor Tree for a change in PCR 14
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PCR 14 has not
changed
PCR 14 is 0
Custom IMA not
being used
Figure D9: Causal Factor Tree for when PCR 14 shows no change
Only PCR 17
changed
New kernel
update
Element booted
with a different
kernel version
Element was
patched/updated
Figure D10: Causal Factor Tree for a change in PCR 17
PCRs 1-7
are 0
Bad BIOS
implementation
TPM/TXT not
enabled
SRTM is not
being
measured
Figure D11: Causal Factor Tree for when PCRs 1-7 are 0
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E Ishikawa Diagrams for Root Cause Analysis
Quote does not
satisfy policy
Material Method Machine
Man/People Measurement
Medium
Environment
policy was not updated
after element update
machine was
assigned to the
wrong policy
attested value
changed between
quotes
ele
m
en
t w
as
up
da
te
d
be
tw
en
 q
uo
te
s 
attested value changed betwen quotes
element was not updated
after policy update
policy was not 
updated to reflect
element update
po
lic
y w
as
up
da
te
d  element
needs
update
po
lic
y w
as
 n
ot
up
da
te
d
check what 
measurements 
have changed 
(other diagrams)
Figure E1: Fishbone diagram for when a quote does not satisfy the policy
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Figure E2: Fishbone diagram for reboot trust failure
PCRs changed
between quotes to
the following values
16: 000...0
17: FFF...F
18: FFF...F
Material Method Machine
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Measurement
Medium
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Figure E3: Fishbone diagram for a missing DRTM measurement
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Material Method Machine
Man/People
Measurement
Medium
Environment
BIOS has been
tampered with
TPM has been
replaced by a 
new one
Motherboad
changed
Figure E4: Fishbone diagram for a change in PCR 0
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Figure E5: Fishbone diagram for a change in PCR 4
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Figure E6: Fishbone diagram for a change in PCR 10
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Figure E7: Fishbone diagram for a change in PCR 17
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Figure E8: Fishbone diagram for when PCRs 1-7 are 0
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F Provisioning of Elements
We define a provisioning module in the attestation libraries, which includes the
provisioning functionality. Listing 2 shows the relevant code from that module.
1 """
2 .. module:: provisioning
3 :synopsis: Module used to provision the NVRAM of an element.
4
5 .. moduleauthor:: Gabriela Limonta <gabriela.limonta@nokia.com>
6 """
7 import tempfile
8 import shutil
9 import uuid
10 from tpm2python.libraries import release_nvram, create_policy_for_sealing,
define_nvram, write_file_to_nvram, read_nvram
11 from pkg_resources import Requirement, resource_filename
12
13
14 default_config_filename = resource_filename(Requirement.parse("
attestation_libraries"), "attestation_libraries/example_ta_config.cfg")
15
16
17 def provision_machine_ta_config(config_filename=default_config_filename,
pcr_policy="sha256:0",
18 nvram_handle="0x1800005", hierarchy="0x40000001",
size=100):
19 try:
20 tmpdirname = tempfile.mkdtemp()
21 policy = "{0}/{1}".format(tmpdirname, uuid.uuid4())
22 release_nvram(nvram_handle, hierarchy)
23 create_policy_for_sealing(pcr_policy, policy)
24 define_nvram(nvram_handle, hierarchy, size, "policyread|policywrite",
policy)
25 write_file_to_nvram(nvram_handle, nvram_handle, config_filename,
pcr_policy)
26 configuration = read_nvram(nvram_handle, nvram_handle, pcr_policy)
27 print("Machine successfully provisioned.")
28 print("Configuration:")
29 print(configuration)
30 print("NVRAM index: {0}".format(nvram_handle))
31 print("Authorization hierarchy: {0}".format(hierarchy))
32 print("NVRAM sealed against PCRS: {0}".format(pcr_policy))
33 except Exception as e:
34 raise Exception("Error provisioning machine: %s" % str(e))
35 finally:
36 shutil.rmtree(tmpdirname, ignore_errors=True)
37
38
39 def write_file(filename, contents):
40 with open(filename, "w") as file:
41 file.write(contents)
42
127
43 def provision_element_id(element_id, pcr_policy="sha256:0", nvram_handle="0
x1800006", hierarchy="0x40000001", size=24):
44 try:
45 tmpdirname = tempfile.mkdtemp()
46 policy = "{0}/{1}".format(tmpdirname, uuid.uuid4())
47 element_id_file = "{0}/{1}".format(tmpdirname, uuid.uuid4())
48 release_nvram(nvram_handle, hierarchy)
49 create_policy_for_sealing(pcr_policy, policy)
50 write_file(element_id_file, element_id)
51 define_nvram(nvram_handle, hierarchy, size, "policyread|policywrite",
policy)
52 write_file_to_nvram(nvram_handle, nvram_handle, element_id_file,
pcr_policy)
53 provisioned_element_id = read_nvram(nvram_handle, nvram_handle, pcr_policy
)
54 print("Machine successfully provisioned.")
55 print("Element ID: {0}".format(provisioned_element_id))
56 print("NVRAM index: {0}".format(nvram_handle))
57 print("Authorization hierarchy: {0}".format(hierarchy))
58 print("NVRAM sealed against PCRS: {0}".format(pcr_policy))
59 except Exception as e:
60 print(e)
61 raise Exception("Error provisioning machine: %s" % str(e))
62 finally:
63 shutil.rmtree(tmpdirname, ignore_errors=True)
Listing 2: Provisioning module of the attestation libraries
Then, we define two scripts for the user to run. These scripts are shown in listings 3
and 4 respectively.
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2
3 import argparse
4 from attestation_libraries.provisioning import provision_machine_ta_config
5 from pkg_resources import Requirement, resource_filename
6
7 default_config_filename = resource_filename(Requirement.parse("
attestation_libraries"), "attestation_libraries/example_ta_config.cfg")
8
9 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Provisions the configuration for a
machine’s trust agent")
10 parser.add_argument(’-c’, ’--config’, help=’Path to the configuration for the
trust agent’, dest=’config_file’,
11 default=default_config_filename, required=False)
12 parser.add_argument(’-s’, ’--size’, help=’Size of the NVRAM area’, dest=’size’,
default=100, required=False)
13 parser.add_argument(’-p’, ’--pcrs’, help=’PCRs against which to seal the
configuration’, default="sha256:0",
14 dest=’pcrs’, required=False)
15 parser.add_argument(’-n’, ’--nvram-handle’, help=’NVRAM index’, dest=’
nvram_handle’, default="0x1800005",
16 required=False)
17 parser.add_argument(’-a’, ’--auth-hierarchy’, help=’Authorization hierarchy’,
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dest=’hierarchy’, default="0x40000001",
18 required=False)
19
20
21 args = parser.parse_args()
22 provision_machine_ta_config(args.config_file, args.pcrs, args.nvram_handle, args.
hierarchy, args.size)
Listing 3: Trust agent configuration provisioning
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2
3 import argparse
4 from attestation_libraries.provisioning import provision_element_id
5
6
7 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Provisions the machine with an
element ID")
8 parser.add_argument(’-e’, ’--element-id’, help=’Element ID’, dest=’element_id’,
required=True)
9 parser.add_argument(’-p’, ’--pcrs’, help=’PCRs against which to seal the element
ID’, default="sha256:0", dest=’pcrs’,
10 required=False)
11 parser.add_argument(’-n’, ’--nvram-handle’, help=’NVRAM index’, dest=’
nvram_handle’, default="0x1800006",
12 required=False)
13 parser.add_argument(’-a’, ’--auth-hierarchy’, help=’Authorization hierarchy’,
dest=’hierarchy’, default="0x40000001",
14 required=False)
15
16 args = parser.parse_args()
17 provision_element_id(args.element_id, args.pcrs, args.nvram_handle, args.
hierarchy)
Listing 4: Element ID provisioning
